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FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO DECONSTRUCTION:
UNDERMINING BLACK LANDOWNERSHIP,
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND




Forty acres and a mule. The government broke that promise to African
American farmers. Over one hundred years later, the USDA broke its promise
to Mr. James Beverly. It promised him a loan to build farrowing houses so
that he could breed hogs. Because he was African American, he never re-
ceived that loan. He lost his farm because of the loan that never was. Nothing
can completely undo the discrimination of the past or restore lost land or lost
opportunities to Mr. Beverly .... 1
Within the African American community, the history of the federal
government's failure to deliver "forty acres and a mule" to African Ameri-
cans after the Civil War has been kept alive from one generation to another.
For many African Americans, the aborted land reform initiative represents
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more than just a discouraging chapter in the failed Reconstruction period.
The broken promise has become a metaphor for the continued unwillingness
of the government to provide African Americans with the same range of eco-
nomic opportunities that it has afforded white Americans to integrate African
Americans into the economic mainstream of society.
African Americans today not only feel betrayed by the government's
retreat on land reform during Reconstruction, but also by the perception that
the government has played an active role for the past half century in dispos-
sessing land from African American families who overcame great obstacles
to acquire land on their own. This perception is particularly strong in rural
African American communities and was vocalized time and again in public
forums held prior to Pigford v. Glickman in 1999, the landmark class action
lawsuit filed by African American farmers against the United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA).2 Despite strong opposition from many
African American farmers, 3 the federal judge in Pigford determined that the
then proposed consent decree was a "fair, adequate and reasonable settle-
ment of the claims" brought by the class of African American farmers.4
In arguing that the settlement should be approved, plaintiffs' counsel
projected that the settlement would cost the federal government $2.25 bil-
lion, which would make it the largest civil rights case settled by the federal
government in U.S. history.5 Under the consent decree, African American
farmers like Mr. Beverly may receive a $50,000 cash payment6 and have all
of their outstanding debt to the USDA that was affected by discriminatory
conduct of USDA officials discharged. 7 Moreover, African American farm-
ers are entitled to some limited, forward-looking injunctive relief.8 More than
anything else, however, many African American farmers who lost their land
through foreclosure as a direct result of the USDA's discrimination made
clear that they wanted the government to restore their land to them.9 Under
2 Id.
3 Fred 0. Williams, Black Farmer Decries Deal With USDA Over Past Bias, THE BUFFALO NEWs,
Feb. 28, 1999, at B 11; see also infra note 151.
4 Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 113.
5 Id. at 95.
6 Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978, 9(a)(iii)(B) (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1999) (consent decree). Fur-
thermore, in order to reduce the tax consequences for successful claimants awarded a $50,000 cash
payment under "Track A" of the settlement, the USDA will pay the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 25%
of the $50,000 payment, or $12,500. Id. I 9(a)(iii)(C).
7 Id. 9(a)(iii)(C). Furthermore, the USDA will send the IRS 25% of the principal amount of any
debt forgiven under 9(a)(iii)(C).
8 Id. 11. Such injunctive relief includes "priority consideration, on a one-time basis, for the pur-
chase, lease, or other acquisition of inventory property to the extent permitted by law." Id. I 1(a). In
addition, the USDA will provide each successful claimant with "priority consideration for one direct
farm ownership loan and one farm operating loan at any time up to five years" after the consent decree
was approved by the court. Id. 1 (b).
9 Pigford, 185 F.RLD. at 109.
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the consent decree, however, most successful claimants will not have their
land returned.'0
It is likely that at least a few of the class members in the Pigford law-
suit lost land that had been in their families since the Reconstruction period.
The predecessors of these class members were not the only African Ameri-
cans who acquired land in the years immediately following Emancipation.I
Though largely unknown and uncelebrated within or outside of the African
American community today, African Americans acquired approximately
fifteen million acres of land in the South in the fifty years following Eman-
cipation. As much as any group of Americans in this nation's history, these
landowners embraced the republican ideal of the rural smallhold and widely
distributed ownership, and believed that only through such ownership could
real economic and political independence be achieved.
12
As we enter a new millennium, the pattern of landownership in the ru-
ral African American community represents the mirror opposite of the trend
in black land acquisition one hundred years ago at the dawn of the twentieth
century. A remarkable history of land acquisition has given way to extraor-
dinary levels of land loss in the past half century. Today, the most current
census of agriculture reveals that African American owner-operators of
farms-whether full or part owners-own at most little more than two mil-
lion acres of land in the United States.' 3 Despite hard-fought struggles to
retain their land, many African Americans have lost land involuntarily.
Even the USDA has acknowledged that for many farmers, "especiall'
minority and limited-resource farmers," land loss has been involuntary.
This Article focuses on one of the primary causes of involuntary black land
loss in recent times-partition sales of black-owned land held under tenan-
cies in common. A partition sale can be viewed as a "private" forced sale
of land held under a concurrent ownership arrangement, typically a tenancy
in common. The combined effect of two sets of legal rules contributes to
the loss of black-owned rural land as a result of partition actions. First, like
many other poor Americans, rural African American landowners have
tended not to make wills; at the owner's death, state intestacy laws enable a
lO Id.
II Prior to Emancipation, a small number of free blacks owned land. Marsha Jean Darling, Land-
ownership, Black, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOUTHERN CULTURE 168-69 (Charles Reagan Wilson & Wil-
liam Ferris eds., 1989).
12 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 109 (1988).
13 1 BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'TOF AGRIC., 1997 CENSUS OFAGRICULTURE, PT. 51, UNnED
STATES SUMMARY AND STATE DATA 25 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE]. The 1997
census reveals that the 11,192 black, fiull-farm owners collectively owned 1,095,093 acres of land. Fur-
thermore, 5,368 black, part owners collectively operated 1,068,343 acres of land, some of vhich they
owned in full. In addition to fill and part owners, an additional 1,891 tenant farmers collectively rented
221,432 acres of land.
14 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 14 (1997) [hereinafter CRAT Report].
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broad class of heirs to acquire an interest in real property of the decedent.
Interests in property transferred by intestacy from one generation to another
become highly fragmented, splintering the fee into hundreds and even thou-
sands of interests. A tenancy in common so splintered is commonly re-
ferred to as fractionated heir property or just heir property.
Second, the resulting tenancies in common are governed by common
ownership rules that fail to distribute rights and responsibilities fairly
among the tenants in common. Any tenant in common, whether a cotenant
holding a minute interest or a substantial interest, may force a sale of the
land, thereby ending the tenancy in common. Any cotenant may sell her in-
terest to someone outside of the family or ownership group, bringing a
stranger into the circle of cotenants, without seeking the consent of the
other cotenants. Despite these broad powers, there are no corresponding
obligations to contribute to the ongoing costs of maintaining the property.
Opportunistic lawyers and land speculators have taken advantage of
these legal rules in order to force sales of black-owned land. Many times,
family members know-or learn from an outsider--that they own an inter-
est in a tenancy in common and decide to cash out. Although some of these
people seek legal assistance, many of these people do not want the entire
land sold.15 Many of these family members exit the tenancy in common by
selling their interest to nonfamily members.' 6 They often do not know the
financial pressure this may place on other cotenants who may wish to re-
main on the land or to preserve it for the family. Unbeknownst to the fam-
ily member, the buyer often takes the interest with the underlying motive of
seeking a partition sale.' 7 Even the partition actions initiated by family
members who seek a sale of the property tend to be brought by "heirs who
are physically removed from the land."' 8
Part I of this Article examines how the legal rules governing land owned
under tenancies in common contribute to black land loss, especially as they
pertain to tenancies in common that have become highly fractionated over
time as land is transmitted from one generation to another by way of intes-
tacy. As indicated, the very rules governing tenancies in common do not
fairly allocate rights and responsibilities among cotenants no matter how con-
solidated the fee may be. This Part also demonstrates how a large percentage
of land owned by rural, African American landowners has become highly
fractionated over time through transfers of land by way of intestacy.
Part II of this Article reviews the history of the African American land
imperative that fueled land acquisition in rural African American communi-
15 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL LAND TENURE




"8 Id. at 126.
From Reconstruction to Deconstruction
ties in the first fifty years after Emancipation. The history falls into two pe-
riods. In the first period, between 1865 and 1910, hundreds of thousands of
rural African Americans acquired land, mostly in the South. Black land-
ownership stabilized between 1910 and 1920. After 1920, rural black own-
ership began a steep decline that paralleled the demise of the black farmer
in America. Black land loss is tied to the demise of the black farmer both
directly and indirectly. The "Great Migration" of African Americans out of
the South-spurred in part by the boll weevil and other natural disasters
that caused widespread crop failures-led many blacks to abandon their
land and left those who maintained ownership with less security of tenure.
Furthermore, the USDA's systemic and persistent discrimination against
black farmers throughout much of the twentieth century caused many black
farmers to lose their land involuntarily through foreclosure and forced oth-
ers to sell their land under distress conditions.
Part III of this Article demonstrates that both political and property
theory support the view that minority landownership can promote dynamic
community life and facilitate greater democratic participation for groups
historically at the margins of American political life. The theories of "de-
mocratic property" articulated by an eclectic group of thinkers ranging from
John Locke to W.E.B. Du Bois have been borne out in case studies of par-
ticular rural communities. In these communities, those who acquired land
participated in the political and civic lives of the wider society at a higher
rate than those similarly situated who did not own land.
Part IV of this Article demonstrates that in some areas the law supports
stable land-based communities or groups because of a legislature's or a
court's belief that there is an important link between stable group ownership
of land and community. In these instances, legislators or judges have made a
judgment that the particular land-based group constitutes an important com-
munity that merits legal protection and support in its effort to maintain its
landownership intact. For example, courts have liberalized the application of
the rules against restraints on alienation as applied to residential housing
schemes such as condominiums and cooperative housing arrangements. For
other groups, such as African Americans who own land under tenancies in
common, judges have not considered it important to support the preferences
of the ownership group to maintain their ownership of the land on an ongo-
ing basis. Judges in partition actions, for example, have considered land-
ownership and monetary distributions from a sale of the land to be fungible;
the value of stable communities has been ignored or minimized.
Part V of this Article offers a series of proposals that would stabilize
and promote landownership in rural African American communities. These
proposals advocate government intervention to promote enhanced land-
ownership-both quantitatively and qualitatively-for African Americans.
Many of the reforms proposed in this Article are not race specific; land ten-
ure for all rural landowners and small farmers generally would be strength-
ened should some of the proposals be enacted.
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Reforming the state laws of intestacy to narrow the class of heirs to
whom property may pass could prevent fractionation of the ownership in-
terest in the first instance. So, too, public interest lawyers and community
activists could work to educate landowners about the importance of estate
planning with the goal of family land retention. Such reforms, however,
would only marginally impact ownership interests that already are fraction-
ated. In these cases, the horse is already out of the barn. Instead, this Arti-
cle maintains that the problem of fractionated heir property within the rural,
African American community justifies more fundamental reform of com-
mon property law and the creation of government institutions that would
have the capacity to help those who own heir property restructure their
ownership in a way that the ownership could be stabilized and the property
could be used productively. Though such government institutions do not
currently exist in the United States, such institutions have operated for dec-
ades in other countries around the world. In Norway, for example, the gov-
emment first established institutions in the 1800s to help landowners
consolidate their fragmented holdings so that land could be used more pro-
ductively in rural areas.
Given the unfulfilled promise of land reform after the Civil War and
the subsequent efforts to undermine those African Americans who acquired
land with little to no support from the government, our society has a clear
moral obligation to reverse the processes that have stripped black landown-
ers of their land. The United States would not be alone in such an en-
deavor. The Vatican recently urged major land reform in poor countries on
moral grounds. 19 Reforming laws in the United States to promote land ac-
quisition and retention in African American communities would be consistent
with this international focus on promoting just patterns of land distribution. 0
Moreover, landownership has facilitated participation in the larger society for
those given the opportunity to acquire land. For this reason, strengthening the
ability of African Americans to maintain landownership should specifically
concern those interested in a more vibrant democracy, who are sympathetic to
increasing the participation of African Americans and reversing their historic
marginal status.
19 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, TOWARDS A BETTER DISTRIBUTION OF LAND
(1997). Other world religions such as the Baha'i Faith have also specifically addressed the importance
of farmers and the role of the agricultural sector to society. See, e.g., Talks 'Abdu'l-Bahd Delivered in
New York (July 1, 1912), in BAHA'I PUBLISHING TRUST, THE PROMULGATION OF UNIVERSAL PEACE
217 (Howard MacNott ed., 2d ed. 1982) ("The fundamental basis of the community is agriculture, till-
age of the soil. All must be producers.").
20 Some political and moral thinkers advocate that land be reallocated to specific ethnic groups in
order to promote enhanced cultural integrity for such groups. Hurst Hannum, for one, states that "[w]ith
few exceptions, a territorial base . . . is essential to the preservation of a group's culture." HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 112 (1990). However, African Ameri-
cans who fought to acquire and retain land throughout the past century were not motivated by the idea of
building a separate and distinct culture that would be separated from the rest of the country.
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As case studies have demonstrated the link between landownership and
healthy community life, land tenure reform provides a tested strategy, con-
sistent with the American liberal tradition, to promote racial justice and a
more democratic society. This would suggest that the federal government's
possible payment of $50,000 to Mr. Beverly without restoring his farm to
him not only fails to make him whole economically, but also leaves him
one short in the "bundle of democratic tools" that he formerly possessed.21
Although the court in Pigford took the fatalistic position that "[h]istorical
discrimination cannot be undone,"' our legal institutions should do their
best to make whole, both as economic and civic actors, African Americans
who were unfairly dispossessed of their land. Short of this, the federal gov-
ernment should act now to ensure that rural, black landownership does not
become merely an interesting, short-lived chapter in American history.
I. PARTITION SALES OF BLACK-OWNED LAND:
A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO LAND LOSS
Though many legal rules and processes contribute to black land loss,
activists and academics agree that partition sales of land held under tenan-
cies in common and tax sales are common avenues of land loss.Y These
experts further conclude that foreclosure,2 4 adverse possession,2 and emi-
nent domain also contribute to land loss.2 6 In some of these legal proceed-
ings, opportunists use practices that border on the unethical to acquire
black-owned land against the clear will of most of those owning such
land.27 One organization with long experience promoting black land reten-
tion claims that "a sale for partition and division is the most widely used le-
gal method facilitating the loss of heir property" within the African
American communities they serve.28 In order to understand how partition
21 The phrase "bundle of democratic tools" plays off of the theory of property as a "bundle of
rights." See, e.g., Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its Past,
in PROPERTY: Nomos XXII, 28,34-57 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1980).
22 185 F.R.D. at 112.
23 See, e.g., THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 251-66, 271-80; sce also THE BLACK
RURAL LANDOWNER-ENDANGERED SPECIES xix-xx (Leo McGee & Robert Boone eds., 1979) [herein-
after THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER]; ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF BLACK-OWNED
LAND INTHE RURAL SOUTH 50 (Robert S. Browme ed., 1973) [hereinafter ONLY Six MILLION ACRES].
24 ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES, supra note 23, at 50; see also Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 87.
25 THE IMPACTOF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 251, 266-71.
26 ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES, supra note 23, at 45.
27 THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 44 ("There is an array of persons and entities
that prey on the heir property situation by practices which are, although technically legal, clearly un-
scrupulous. These persons and entities include lawyers, judges, individual citizens, businessmen, mar-
ginal lending institutions, land speculators, and public officials.").
28 Id. at 273; see also John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced Partition-
ing Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REv. 755, 756 n.9 (1986) (noting that Edward Pennick of
the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund estimated in 1985 that half of the cases
at that time leading to the drop in black landownership involved partition actions that lead to a sale of
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sales cause loss of black-owned land, one needs to understand the tenancy
in common as a form of concurrent ownership of land and the consequences
of the lack of estate planning common to a large number of poor, rural Afri-
can Americans.
A. Tenancies in Common
1. General Characteristics. Tenancies in common are the most
widespread form of concurrent estates in land.29 Unlike the joint tenancy,
which normally requires the presence of the four "unities" of time, title, inter-
est, and possession, a tenancy in common merely provides that each of the
common owners who holds an undivided interest in the property is entitled to
use and possess the entire property.30 Unlike the joint tenancy's right of sur-
vivorship, a tenant in common may alienate her interest during life and at
death without seeking the consent of her other cotenants.
31
Like the joint tenancy and other common law concurrent estates, but
unlike other forms of common ownership of equity resources created by
statute such as the corporation, no formal management structure inheres by
law in a tenancy in common. The allocation of management responsibili-
ties between tenants in and out of possession must be worked out in each
particular case, if this allocation is addressed at all. The common law has
developed some rules that allocate rights between cotenants with respect to
use and maintenance of the property. These include rules that govern the
rights of an "ousted" cotenant, the distribution of rental income paid by
third parties, and the right to contribution for the payment of ongoing costs
such as property taxes, mortgages, and necessary repairs.32 Yet, these rules
are not comprehensive, uniform, or prophylactic; they do not allocate re-
sponsibility for paying the ongoing expenses of co-owned property between
the common owners in the first instance, the area in which most conflicts
among tenants occur.
A tenant in common who fails to pay her proportional share of these
ongoing expenses does not lose any interest in the property.33 Not surpris-
ingly, "freerider" problems34 are frequent. The tenant who has paid more
black-owned property). Although the author has spoken to representatives of both the Land Loss Pre-
vention Project in Durham, North Carolina and the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assis-
tance Fund, and confirmed that they have handled hundreds of cases in which black rural landowners
have lost land as the result of partition actions, a LEXIS search uncovered only one reported state case that
explicitly addressed the partition sales of black-owned rural land. See McNeely v. Bone, 698 S.W.2d 512,
513 (Ark. 1985) (holding that partition sale of black-owned property did not violate the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution even if the sale of the land was below market price).
29 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM El AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.2, at 188 (2d ed. 1993).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 190.
32 Id. §§ 5.9, 5.10, at 215-22.
33 THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 43.
34 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 49-50 (4th ed. 1998).
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than a pro rata share of the ongoing costs of maintaining the property may
seek to recoup payments made in excess of her share against other coten-
ants.35 However, such contribution actions can jeopardize the interests of
those who desire to maintain ongoing ownership of the land. Some courts
permit a tenant in common to initiate an independent action short of a final
accounting against her fellow cotenants, seeking contribution for repair
costs incurred in excess of the tenant's pro rata share. Other courts main-
tain that such a cotenant can only recover these excess repair expenses in a
final accounting as part of a partition action that terminates the concurrent
ownership estate.36 Many times one cotenant pays more than his share of
the property taxes. Due to the fact that the cotenants are not personally li-
able in most circumstances for payment of the property taxes, the tenant
who has paid more than his pro rata share of the property taxes may only
recoup such excess expenses after a court sells the property at a judicial sale
and equitably distributes the proceeds from the sale.
37
2. Partition Sale. In most social contexts, a tenancy in common
represents an unstable form of common equity ownership. Each interest
may be freely alienated by the holder, allowing any cotenant to bring a
stranger into the community of ownership. A person holding an undivided
interest in a tenancy in common--no matter how small that interest
is---may file a partition action to terminate the cotenancy without the con-
sent of the other cotenants. 38 The court will either order that the property be
partitioned in kind (resulting in the physical division of property) or that the
entire property be sold and the proceeds of the sale distributed.3
Most state statutes provide that a physical division of the property is
the preferred remedy in a partition action; these statutes indicate that a parti-
tion sale should be ordered only if it would be inequitable to order a parti-
tion in kind.40 Yet, courts now order partition sale in almost every case.
35 CUNNINGHAM ETAL.,supra note 29, at 215-17.
36 Id. at215.
37 Id. at 217.
38 DUKEMINIER & KIuER, supra note 34, at 340. The remedy of partition is also available to joint
tenants, but it is not available to tenants by the entirety. Id. at 341.
39 CUNNINGHAM Er AL, supra note 29, § 5.13, at 229.
40 See ALA. CODE § 35-6-40 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 09A5.290 (Lexis 1998); ARK. CODE ANN-. §
18-60-401 (Michie 1987); CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 872.210 (West 1980); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-28-
101 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-495 (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2901 (Michie 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-6-140 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT § 668-1 (Michie 1988); IOWA CODE 651.3 (West
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1003 (1994); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.120 (Michie 1998); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:56-1 (Vest 2000); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-107 (Michie 1996); MIN,. STAT. §
558.17 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 528.030 (Vest 1953); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70-29-101 (1999); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 39.010 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-1 (West 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. §
901 (MeKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-16-01 (Michie 1996); OR. RE%. STAT. §
105.205 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2145-1 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-39-1 (MichIe
1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 842.02 (1999).
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Although some courts and commentators still refer to partition sale as a
drastic remedy,42 the current preference for partition sale reflects the ascen-
dant economic view that places primary importance on individual wealth
maximization. According to this view, an economically valuable parcel of
land should be allocated to the person willing to pay the highest price on the
free market.43 This assures efficient use, at least theoretically. In accor-
dance with this view, partition sale is preferred over partition in kind be-
cause land sold as a unit often has a higher economic value than the
aggregate value of subdivided parcels that result from a division in kind.
44
Under this paradigm, it is irrelevant if many of these forced sales transfer
land from poor smallholders to wealthier people or to corporate entities be-
cause the value of landownership is measured against the market. As one
commentator holding this view has claimed:
[A] rule favoring sales in partition actions would promote efficiency by placing
the property on the open market where co-owners opposing a sale or having a
particular emotional attachment to the property would have an opportunity to re-
tain possession by outbidding all comers. Therefore, the market price would re-
flect both the objective and the subjective values of the property.... Under the
principle of wealth maximization, when property is placed on the open market,
courts are assured that the property will fetch the highest price possible and will
end up in the hands of the party who values it the most.
45
South Carolina's statute, however, does not provide that an in-kind division is preferred. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-61-10 (1977 & West Supp. 1999).
The following statutes do not express a clear preference: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1211 (West
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 721 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 64.031 (West 1997); 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/17-101 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-4-5-1 (West 1979 & Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:1701 (West 2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 241 § I (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.3304 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-21-1 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2170 (1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 547-C:1 (1997 & Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-3 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5307.01 (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tiL 68, § 101 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-20-3 (1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-27-010 (1980); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 23.0001 (Vernon 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 5161 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (Michie 1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.52.090 (1992 & Supp.
2001); W. VA. CODEANN. § 37-4-1 (Michie 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-32-101 (Michie 1999).
In Maine and Idaho, no state statute or legislation addresses partition of real property.
41 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 29, at 231; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 34, at 347;
4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 612, at 651 (rev. ed. 1982); Candace Reid, Note, Partitions
in Kind: A Preference Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 862 (1986).
42 See, e.g., Vesper v. Farnsworth, 40 Wis. 357, 359 (Wis. 1876) (holding that a partition "sale is a
dangerous expedient, exposing those of the parties who are not able to bid at the same, to the deprivation
of their property without just compensation"); see also JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 719 (2d ed. 1997) ("[P]artition is a drastic remedy that may very well result
in a sale of the property.").
43 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82-86 (5th ed. 1998).
44 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 665 (1998).
45 Reid, supra note 41, at 878-79.
From Reconstruction to Deconstniction
By liberal, or even routine, orders for partition sale, the courts now en-
able an individual cotenant, no matter how small her interest is in the land,
to force a sale of the entire property in order to maximize the amount of
money she will receive in the distribution of the proceeds.
The current preference for partition sale represents a particular applica-
tion of the modem view that land is merely a fungible commodity whose
value should be determined by the market. The shift in the view of the
economic importance of land roughly tracks the transition from classical to
neo-classical economics that many economic scholars claim occurred in the
late 1800S. 47 By the conclusion of World War II, economists increasingly
challenged the traditional view that land holds unique value.48 At present,
the view that "land is no different than the other factors of production" is
the predominant one in most economic textbooks, and those textbooks have
directly influenced the thinking of economists and non-economists alike.
49
The development of the law in partition actions mirrors the shift in
views by many economists with respect to the importance of landowner-
ship. Older judicial opinions, along with a handful of more contemporary
decisions, take into account the non-economic interests of those who wish
to maintain landownership. In Delfino v. Vealencis,50 for example, the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut reversed a lower court decision that ordered a
partition sale and stated that "[iut is the interests of all of the tenants in
common that the court must consider; ... and not merely the economic gain
of one tenant, or a group of cotenants." 5' Now, courts primarily seek to
protect the economic interests of individual cotenants. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed in subpart IV.C, the modem practice of routinely ordering partition
sales in order to maximize the monetary return of an individual tenant
stands in contrast to the legal rules regulating exit from other common
ownership forms such as corporations, other forms of business organization,
and condominium associations.
There is evidence that some federal judges in partition actions involv-
ing Native American-owned land have more faithfully adhered to partition
statutes that require judges to weigh the economic and noneconomic impli-
cations of ordering a partition sale as opposed to the preferred remedy of a
46 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMIAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 63 (1985). In comparing land trans-
actions in the early American colonies with property transfers in England, Friedman states: "Land trans-
actions shifted from status to contract; land rights were no longer matters of family, birth, and tradition;
rather, land was a commodity, traded on the open market. This was a slow but inexorable process. It
was not complete until the nineteenth century, and in a sense not even then." Id.
47 Emery N. Castle, Why Land Matters (1995) (paper commissioned for a conference, "Who Owns
America? Land and Resource Tenure Issues in a Changing Environment" held at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, June 21-24, 1995) (on file with the Land Tenure Center).
48 See id. at 1.
49 Id. at 5.
50 436 A2d 27 (Conn. 1980).
51 Id. at 33.
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division in kind.52 As in many areas of federal Indian law, however, the
laws governing partition sales of Native American-owned land resemble a
patchwork quilt due to the fact that jurisdiction between state, federal, and
tribal authorities in such actions often differs from one case to another.
53
For example, jurisdiction depends upon whether a fee interest in land is
held under a restricted fee patent or is an unrestricted interest. 54 At least
some federal courts vested with jurisdiction over such partition actions ap-
pear to be more sensitive to the implications and equities of ordering a par-
tition sale than many state courts hearing partition actions in the non-Native
American context. For example, in Oyler v. United States,55 on a motion
for reconsideration of a court-ordered partition sale of a fractionated allot-
ment that had both Indian and non-Indian tenants in common, 56 the district
court set aside its order for a partition sale. Instead, the court imposed an
order that provided mixed relief including division in kind of most of the
ninety-four-acre tract, and sale and reallocation to one group of defendants
of a 2.6-acre tract.57 In ordering a remedy that mostly consisted of partition
in kind, the court noted that the majority of the interest holders opposed
sale.58 The court also considered the consequences of ordering a sale of
land that the defendants valued as part of their heritage, especially in a
manner that would not fully compensate the parties after subtracting the
costs of the litigation. The court stated:
[I]t appears less likely to the court that all of the parties will realize the full
value of their interest in the land if a public sale of the property occurs. Even
if the land is sold precisely at the appraised value, after the costs of this action
are subtracted from the proceeds of the sale, some of the parties will receive
precious little compensation for land which, if nothing else, represents their
Native American heritage.59
The Oyler court acknowledged not just the real-world, economic rami-
fications of ordering a partition sale, but specifically took into account the
land's significance to one group of Americans dispossessed of much of their
52 See sources cited at note 40, supra.
53 See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 623 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982).
54 A Native American owner who owns a parcel or interest in land under a restricted fee patent
holds the legal title subject to federal restrictions against alienation, encumbrance, and taxation. Oyler
v. United States, No. 92-2104, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4633, at *6 n.2 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 1993),
55 Oyler v. United States, No. 92-2104, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5652, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 1995).
56 This 94-acre tract in Johnson County, Kansas, presents a good example of how convoluted owner-
ship of land allotted-under treaty or statute-to individual Native Americans or Native American families
from former reservation lands can become over time. In 1993, over 50 tenants in common owned an undi-
vided interest in the land. Oyler, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4633, at *5. Of these cotenants, some were Native
American and others were non-Native American. Id. Of the Native American cotenants, some held their
interest in restricted status and others held unrestricted interests that were freely alienable. Id. at *6.
57 Id. at *3-6.
58 Id. at *14.
59 Id. at *14 n.9.
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historical land base. Unfortunately, the Oyler court's concern for preserving
Native American heritage land has few, if any, analogs in partition cases in-
volving land acquired by African Americans following Emancipation.
B. Patterns of Estate Planning Make Much Black-Owned Land a
Target for Land Speculators
The tenancy in common represents a potentially unstable form of land-
ownership because alienability is unrestricted and the partition remedy is
weighted toward dissolution. A tenancy in common with a large number of
cotenants is even more unstable simply because the problems of free-riding
and exit are multiplied. 60 Because of the low incidence of estate planning
among poor, rural African Americans,6 1 much of the black-owned land base
in the South has been traditionally transferred from one generation to an-
other under state intestacy laws.6  Property acquired under the intestacy
laws is commonly referred to as "heir property."
63
Although a tenancy in common created by volition and a tenancy in
common created by operation of the laws of intestacy may be governed by
the same set of property laws,64 these two methods of formation yield ovn-
ership arrangements that are vastly different in character. A tenancy in
common created consensually resembles a closely held corporation: there
tends to be a small number of co-owners, each member of the ownership
structure knows the other owners, and the owners are likely to live within
close proximity of one another. A tenancy in common created under the
laws of intestacy, by contrast, bundles together groups of people who may
possess little actual connection to one another and perhaps lack even knowl-
edge of one another's identity.
6
60 See C. Scott Graber, Heirs Property: The Problems and Possible Solutions, CLEARINGHoUsE REV.
273,277 (1978) ("One thousand heirs provide 1,000 targets to a person who really wants the land").
61 As previously discussed, the incidence of will making among rural, African American landown-
ers may not be that much lower than the rate of will making among poor people generally despite the
assumption by many commentators who have written articles suggesting that African American land-
owners make wills at an especially low rate. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
62 Robert Zabawa, "And the Devil Got Alabama and Georgia": Black Land Ownership in the South
(1995) (paper commissioned for a conference, "Who Owns America? Land and Resource Tcnure Issues
in a Changing Environment," held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 21-24, 1995) (on file
with the Land Tenure Center).
63 THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 8. In St. Lucia, a country in the Caribbean,
such land is referred to as "family land:' See John W. Bruce, Family Land Tenure and Agricultural De-
velopment in St. Lucia (Land Tenure Ctr., Madison, Wis.), Dec. 1983.
64 The two different types oftenancies in common will be governed by the same property law if the
tenancy in common created by agreement adopts the default rules governing tenancies in common that
automatically apply to a tenancy in common created by operation of law.
65 THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 62. For example, one study has revealed that a
typical heir property tract in the Southeast is owned by eight people, five of whom live outside of the
southeastern region. Id.
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As time passes, not only does the number of interests increase in a ten-
ancy in common created by operation of law, but divergences also appear in
the size of individual ownership interests, especially after any in the first
generation of heirs with children or lineal heirs die and their interests pass to
their descendants. 66 When the property comes to be held by owners from
multiple generations, the common owners are likely to value the land differ-
ently and conflicts are more likely to arise. Further, as the number of inter-
ests increase, the owners are more likely to live in scattered locations.
Decisions regarding the disposition of the property that may have been fairly
simple to coordinate when all of the tenants in common resided, for example,
in Sumpter County, Alabama, become more difficult if some common own-
ers live in Demopolis, Alabama, others in Albany, Georgia, and still others in
Chicago, Illinois.67 And as the number of interests increases, it becomes dif-
ficult to locate and keep track of the owners: problems arise with the unlo-
catable heir and with unknown heirs.68 Moreover, heir property often lacks
record title.69 Because of these characteristics of heir property, economic
development of a significant proportion of land owned by African Ameri-
cans has been stifled. Owners have difficulty obtaining financing and co-
owners may not be able to agree on the most appropriate use of the land.
Consider the case study of an African American estate in Mississippi
conducted by the Emergency Land Fund. A certain African American
named John Brown purchased eighty acres of land in Rankin County, Mis-
sissippi, in 1887.70 After he died intestate in 1935, the land continued to be
passed down by intestacy. By the time an heir holding more than fifty per-
cent of the interest in the land filed for a partition in kind of the property in
1978, there were sixty-seven heirs who held an interest in the property, with
the smallest interest holder owning a 1/19440th interest in the land. 1 As in
many other cases, the desire of the majority interest holder to secure a
physical partition of the land was frustrated when the court decided to order a
sale of the property after a few of the other heirs holding a minority interest
objected to the proposed division of the property.72 The fractionated heir
property problem within rural African American communities manifested by
the John Brown estate is typical; a 1984 study estimated that forty-one per-
cent of black-owned land in the southeastern states is heir property.73
If heir property tends to be highly fractionated and fractionation in-
creases the risk of partition, then this pattern of family wealth transmission
66 See id. at 40.
67 See id. at 42-43.
68 Id. at 43.
69 Id. at 44.
70 Id. at 283.
71 Id. at 283-85.
72 Id. at 283.
73 Id. at 64,475.
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directly contributes to black land loss. Two separate studies conducted
within restricted geographical areas of the South indicate that at least half
and perhaps most rural, African American landowners in the South have not
made wills. One study surveyed 1,708 black landowners in ten counties lo-
cated in five southeastern states and found that eighty-one percent of the
black owners of rural parcels had not made wills. 7 - Another study of 120
rural, black landowners in twelve counties in south-central Alabama found
that fifty-six percent of these landowners had not made wills.
75
Despite such evidence of low rates of estate planning, the assumption
that the rate of will making for rural, African American landowners lags far
behind those of other, similarly situated landowners is hard to evaluate
given the lack of comparative empirical studies. It is difficult to determine
whether the pattern of will making within the rural African American land-
owning group is a marker of class or race because similar studies of poor,
rural white landowners do not appear to exist.76 One broad study found that
fifty-five percent of all people (whether landowners or not) surveyed in five
states had not made wills.7  This study also found that sixty-five percent of
those with an annual family income below $65,000 did not have wills.
78
Further, seventy-two percent of those with estates worth less than S130,000
and fifty percent of those with estates worth less that S260,000 had not
made wills.
79
Moreover, the explanations offered by academics for the number of ru-
ral black landowners who have not made wills are not very convincing. Al-
though one study ascribes the failure of many rural black landowners to
make wills to a legal system that African Americans had come to mistrust
because their property interests were often not protected by it, there does
not appear to be any empirical evidence to support this assertion.' In fact,
the results of a survey of black landowners-included in the report-seem
to contradict the historical explanation and suggest that many of those who
74 Id. at 65, 113.
75 Robert Zabawa & Ntam Baharanyi, Estate Planning Strategies and the Continuing Phenomenon
ofBlack-OvnedLandloss, RURAL SOC., July 1992, at 13, 16. The rates ofwiVl making for black landov,-
ers in both the broader survey conducted in 10 counties in 5 southeastern states and the study limited to 10
counties in Alabama were higher than the rate that the Emergency Land Fund forecasted. In their study on
heir property, the Emergency Land Fund hypothesized that approximately 90" of black landowners in the
Southeast will die without making wills. See THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 114.
76 THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 118 (noting that no comparable survey explor-
ing the will-making practices of rural, white landowners has been conducted). It would be instructive to
conduct such a study to examine whether poor white, rural communities experience a comparable prob-
lem of land loss.
77 LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL, FAMILY PROPERTY LAw 30 (2d ed. 1997).
78 Id.
79 1d.
so THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 115 ("Estate planning through testacy was not
incorporated into black thought because blacks felt that they could not trust or rely on a legal system
which had traditionally failed to protect their interests.").
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experienced the most direct racism had learned the importance of making
wills.8' Other commentators have suggested that descendants of slaves
brought from Africa to different parts of the world have come to rely on the
laws of intestacy to further the supposed West African customary practice
of succession under which all children inherit.82 However, given the wide
representation of ethnic groups among those who were brought to this coun-
try as slaves from Africa and the impact that the slavery experience had on
transforming traditional culture, it appears unlikely that the rate of will
making can be linked to some particularized, traditional African cultural
practice.8 3 Interestingly, the cultural explanations offered for the failure of
many people of African descent to make wills parallel explanations some
have offered for the high percentage of Native Americans who have not
made wills, which has lead to the fractionation of many individual Native
American allotments.8 4
8s See id. at 121. The report states the following:
Fifty (50%) percent of the respondent will-makers were over fifty-five (55) and eighty-four (84%)
percent were over thirty-five (35) years of age. Although the older black landowners still harbor a
distrust of the legal system, many have evidently learned that the legal system can be relied upon
to support affirmative initiative to protect their land. By making wills, they can provide for orderly
and efficient disposition of their property....
Younger minority landowners have not learned the bitter lesson taught the older generation
regarding minority land retention in the rural South. They did not witness the loss often (10) mil-
lion acres of black-owned land between 1910 and 1969. They may soon learn, however, but the
lesson may be costly.
Id. The difference in the rate of will making between older black landowners and younger black land-
owners, highlighted in the foregoing study, closely tracks the difference by age in the rate of will mak-
ing as revealed in the five-state survey of the rates of will making, especially when accounting for the
economic class of the landowners. In the five-state survey, 61% of landowners between the ages of 46
and 54 and 63% between the ages of 55 and 64 had made wills; in contrast, only 12% of those between
17 and 30 years of age and 35% between the ages of3l and 45 had made wills. See WAGGONER ETAL.,
supra note 77, at 30.
82 Edith Clarke, Land Tenure and the Family in Four Selected Communities in Jamaica, I SOC. &
ECON. STUD. 81, 86-87 (1953).
83 See Bruce, supra note 63, at 14-15.
A group called the Intertribal Agricultural Committee (IAC), whose membership consists of Na-
tive American tribes that control over eighty percent of the land held in trust by the federal government
for Native Americans, has played an important role in the policy debates addressing proposed reforms
aimed at ameliorating the fractionation of heir property in Indian country. In 1999, the IAC submitted
testimony to Congress as Congress was considering amendments to the Indian Land Act. In explaining
how the problem of fractionation of heir property developed for Native Americans, the IAC offered their
view of the reason Native Americans had not made wills after ancestral Native Americans lands were allot-
ted in the late nineteenth century. The IAC stated:
The lack of a tradition of private ownership resulted in a lack of formal wills or other con-
veyance documents which would have prevented the current situation. This situation may not have
become a problem if left to traditional tribal remedies, because the established tribal decision mak-
ing process would have re-allocated the holdings. However, the allotments were made under fed-
eral provisions, and therefore the distributions of a decedent's assets were also based on the
English Common Law, not the local law or tribal cultures understood by the affected individuals.
From Reconsttction to Deconstruction
Although the root causes of the low incidence of will making among
rural, African American landowners are not well-understood, it does appear
that many black landowners lack a sophisticated understanding of the legal
rules governing the transfer of property from one generation to another.
Two studies indicate that a clear majority of the black landowners surveyed
were apathetic about preparing a will, expressing the sentiment that they
simply "'haven't got around to it."'"5 However, the surveys also revealed
that many of the landowners were quite misinformed about the laws
governing tenancies in common. In one study, almost seventy-five percent
of those acquiring property through intestacy believed that all the tenants in6
common must consent to a sale of the land. The misconceptions held by
many rural African Americans concerning the laws that govern tenancies in
common suggest that these communities have comparatively limited access
to attorneys and indicate that meaningful policy reform would include pro-
posals designed to increase the access such owners have to legal profes-
sionals for purposes of basic estate planning.
The reliance on intestacy has contributed to intense fractionation of
property held under common ownership structures within other poor com-
munities both in the United States and in other countries. For Native
Americans, one commentator has stated that the heirship problem "[is] sec-
ond only to alienation among the evils wrought by" the era of the allotment
of Native American lands that was part of federal Native American policy
between 1887 and 1934.87 Studies by the United States Senate and House of
Representatives in the early 1960s indicated that one-half of the allotted Na-
tive American lands then held in trust by the federal government had become
fractionated 8 The Supreme Court noted the problem in Hodel v. Irving:
"The failure of the allotment program became even clearer as successive gen-
erations came to hold the allotted lands. Thus 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels
became splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels
having hundreds, and many parcels having dozens, of owners.' s9
The Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendment of 1999: Hearing on S. 1586 Before the Senate Comm.
on Indian Affairs and the House Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 282 (1999) (statement of Ross
Racine, Director of Programs, Intertribal Agriculture Council).
85 THE IMPAcr OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 113; Zabawa & Baharanyi, supra note 75, at 18.
86 THE IMPACTOFHEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 123.
87 Michael L. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in S. 2480.S.2663: Before the Sen-
ate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong. 81 (1984); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707
(1987) ("The policy of allotment of Indian lands quickly proved disastrous for the Indians. Cash gener-
ated by land sales to whites was quickly dissipated, and the Indians, rather than farming the land them-
selves, evolved into petty landlords, leasing their allotted lands to white ranchers and farmers and living
off the meager rentals").
88 See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86"" CONG., INDIAN HEIttSiIP L.AD
STUDY (Comm. Print 1961); SENATE COMM. ON INTERIORAND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86,TH CoNG.. INDhN
HEIRSHIP LAND SURVEY (Comm. Print 1960-61).
89 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 707.
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Just as the John Brown estate highlighted the intense fractionation of
heir property typical of many rural, African American property holdings,
certain tracts of land on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake Traverse Reservation
demonstrate the extreme degree of fractionation for all too many Native
American allotments. The average tract on that reservation has 196 owners
and the average owner holds undivided interests in fourteen tracts. 90 An es-
pecially dramatic example of this fractionation is tract 1305. According to
the Supreme Court:
Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. It is valued at
$8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom receive less than $.05 in annual
rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than $1. The largest interest holder
receives $82.85 annually. The common denominator used to compute frac-
tional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. The smallest heir re-
ceives $.01 every 177 years. If the tract were sold (assuming the 489 owners
could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value, he would be entitled to $.000418.
The administrative costs of handlin this tract are estimated by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs at $17,560 
annually.w
t
Fractionation of individually owned Native American trust land pre-
cludes meaningful economic development, preventing wealth generation
from one generation to another. However, such fractionation has not led to
significant land loss because of the different applications of partition laws
in cases involving much of individually or family-owned Native American
trust land. Until 1980, the Interior Department had maintained that even a
partition in kind of a Native American allotment required the consent of all of
the tenants in common.92 In 1980, a federal district court in South Dakota
ruled in Sampson v. Andrus that a partition may be made at the discretion of
the Secretary of the Interior upon application of just a single tenant in com-
mon.93 Even after Sampson, however, partition sales do not appear to be a
major source of land loss in the Native American community.
Outside of the United States, other poor communities have also experi-
enced significant problems with fractionation of commonly owned prop-
erty. In St. Lucia and other Caribbean countries, for example, "family land"
has become intensely fractionated over time due to the failure of landown-
ers to make wills.94 Owners of such land find it difficult to secure credit
90 Id. at 712.
91 Id. at 713.
92 COHEN, supra note 53, at 623; see also Lawson, supra note 87, at 60; Ethel J. Williams, Com-
ment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. REv. 709,
714 (1971). Under current law, a partition in kind of an inherited trust allotment may be made either by
the Secretary of the Interior without application if it is determined that the partition is to the "advantage
of the heirs" or after the heirs make a written application for partition in kind and it is determined that
the land is capable of partition. 25 C.F.R. § 152.33(a)(b) (2000).
93 Sampson v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 240,241 (C.D.S.D. 1980).
94 See Bruce, supra note 63, at 3-4.
From Reconstruction to Deconstnction
and marketable title, limiting productive use of their land.95 But the com-
parative Native American and Caribbean case studies show that the dy-
namic of land loss requires more than just fractionated heir property.
Partition rules are crucial. In contrast to rural African Americans, St.
Lucian owners of "family land" have not lost much of their land through
partition because the law does not allow an individual common owner to
seek partition without the consent of all the other common owners.
96
II. THE AFRICAN AMERICAN LAND IMPERATIVE: AN AMERICAN
SUCCESS STORY UNDERMINED BY SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST BLACK LANDOWNERS
A. Between 1865-19 10, An African American Land Imperative Fueled
Significant Black Land Acquisitions
Africans brought to this country and enslaved were denied the right to
acquire land by law.97  Some scholars have suggested that the African
slaves had no prior experience with private ownership of land. 93 According
to this view, although the slaves were brought to the New World from dif-
ferent regions in West Africa and differed according to linguistic and cultural
practices, the slaves as a group were all drawn from societies with communal
land tenure regimes that left no space for individual resource ownership.
9
This broad anthropological interpretation of African land tenure systems
should be read with healthy skepticism. Although some commentators may
lack a nuanced understanding of the land tenure regimes of the African socie-
ties from which slaves were drawn, it is clear that the American slave system
undeniably squelched the ability of slaves to practice the culture of their Afri-
can ancestors. 00 As time progressed, the slaves "began to think of them-
selves more and more as individuals bound together by the exploitative
95 Id. at 21-23; see also THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 241-50, 306-07.
96 Cf. Bruce, supra note 63, at 4 (noting that an administrator of an intestate's estate in St. Lucia
may not partition the land in kind unless all ofthe heirs consent.).
97 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 197
(1956).
98 R-J.M. BLACKETT, Robert Campbell and the Triangle of the Black Experience, in BEATING
AGAINST THE BARRIERS: BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS IN NINETEENTH-CEitURY AFRO-AMERiCAN HISTORY
164 (1986); PAUL BOHANNAN & PHILIP D. CURTIN, AFRICA AND AFRICANS 124-28 (1971); see also
SIDNEY V. MINTZ & RICHARD PRICE, AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TilE AFRIcAN-A.iEICAN
PAST: A CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE 5 (1976) (challenging the view that West African societies from
which many slaves to the Americas were brought shared many overreaching cultural practices including
"corporate" as opposed to private ownership of land).
99 See LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH: 1790-1915, at 10 (1990).
100 STAMPP, supra note 97, at 362.
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system of human bondage"''1 1 and less as culturally united by distinct Afri-
can cultures.1
0 2
Relegated to the lowest rungs of an economic system that promoted in-
dividualism, many African American slaves accepted the notion that a bet-
ter life was possible through the accumulation of capital and property, even
if the opportunities for most slaves to participate in the economic system
were severely constrained.10 3 From their earliest days in America, an inter-
nal slave economy developed that enabled some African Americans to par-
ticipate in limited ways in the economic life of this country. In early
colonial Virginia, for example, many plantation owners set aside small
tracts of land for their slaves to use to grow food for themselves. 10 4 Al-
though slaves were almost never allowed to acquire real property, many ac-
quired some personal property that was owned individually, as opposed to
collectively. As one scholar has described:
Property ownership among slaves remained small during the eighteenth cen-
tury, but by the eve of the Civil War-according to the comments of slave-
holders, increasing enactments to halt "pretended ownership," the recollections
of former slaves, and the reports of postwar investigators-considerable num-
bers of slaves had become property owners. They possessed cattle, milk cows,
horses, pigs, chickens, cotton, rice, tobacco, gold and silver coin, wagons, bug-
gies, fancy clothing, and in rare instances even real estate.
10 5
Furthermore, in the antebellum period, the incentive to acquire capital
was particularly strong for those African Americans given the opportunity
to purchase their freedom.'0 6 Those fortunate enough to be freed spared no
effort to become property owners.1
0 7
After issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the freedmen and
freedwomen fully expected the government to redistribute land throughout
the South to a new class of black smallholders. 0 8 The great majority of
emancipated slaves had experience only in agriculture, 10 9 but lacked the re-
101 SCHWENINGER, supra note 99, at 27.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 12.
104 See id. at 30.
105 Id. at 59.
106 See id. at 65-66.
107 See id. at 69.
108 See Manning Marable, The Land Question in Historical Perspective: The Economics of Poverty
in the Blackbelt South, 1865-1920, in THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER, supra note 23, at 4. Eric Foner
has argued that the aspiration for landownership among African Americans after emancipation was simi-
lar to the post-emancipation yearnings of freedmen in many other countries throughout the Western
Hemisphere, such as Haiti and Brazil. However, Foner states that only "American blacks emerged from
slavery convinced that the federal government had committed itself to land distribution," FONER, supra
note 12, at 104.
309 See Adell Brown, Jr. et al., Structural Changes in U.S. Agriculture: Implications for African
American Farmers, REV. BLACK POL. ECON., spring 1994, at 58.
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sources to purchase land." 0 These hopes of land reallocation seemed justi-
fied by events that occurred both in the closing phases of the Civil War and
in the actions taken by the federal government soon thereafter. In his march
through the South, General Sherman issued Field Order No. 15 on January
16, 1865, declaring as abandoned land the Sea Islands stretching from Sa-
vannah, Georgia to Charleston, South Carolina, a total of 485,000 acres.1 1
Within months of this order, General Rufus Saxton, charged with imple-
menting Sherman's order, settled 40,000 freedmen on the islands on forty-
acre plots." 2 In addition to land, Sherman authorized Saxton to give sur-
plus horses and mules to the freedmen to the extent they were available.
113
As it would turn out, General Saxton's allotment of land to the freedmen on
the Sea Islands under Field Order No. 15 would constitute the greatest land
redistribution program ever benefiting African Americans in this country's
history.'
4
Furthermore, in March 1865, Congress established the Bureau of Refu-
gees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands ("Freedmen's Bureau"). ' 15 The
legislation creating this agency "promised every male citizen, whether
refugee or freedman, forty acres of land at rental for three years with an op-
tion to buy."'"16 And in 1866, Congress passed the Southern Homestead Act
opening to the freed slaves settlement of forty-six million acres of public
lands.' The 1866 Homestead Act differed from the Homestead Act of
1862 in that the latter only provided for homesteading by non-Confederate
whites.'18 In the first two years of the Southern Homestead Act, applicants
could apply for settlement of eighty acres of land; later this limit was in-
creased to 160 acres.
119
Ultimately, however, hopes for significant land reform were de-
stroyed. 20  The impact of the Freedmen's Bureau was muted and the
Southern Homestead Act proved to be "a dismal failure."' 2' Although the
110 ROGER L. RANSOM & RICHARD SLrCH, ONE KIND OF FREEDOM: THE EcONO.MtC CONSEQUENC S
O EMANCIPATON 81 (1977).
III RICHARD A. COuTO, AIN'T GONNA LET NOBODY TURN ME ROUND: TilE PURSUIT OF RACIAL
JUSTICE INTHE RURAL SOUTH 163 (1991).
112 Id. at 165.
113 Id. Eric Foner has suggested that the program of land distribution on the Sea Islands that included
forty acres and, sometimes, a horse or a mule, may account for the familiar call for "forty acre and a mule"
after the end of the Civil War. FONERSUpra note 12, at 70-71.
114 CoUTO, supra note I11, at 165.
11s Freedman and Refugees Act, ch. 90, 13 Sta. 507 (1865).
116 COUTO, supra note I 11, at 165.
117 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH!WItiTE WEALTH: A NEW PER-
SPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 14 (1997).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See FONER, supra note 12, at 161.
121 Id. at 246.
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Freedmen's Bureau had 850,000 acres of land under its control in 1865,122
half of the land was returned to the former white owners by mid-1866.
23
Furthermore, several months after passage of the Freedmen's Bill, President
Andrew Johnson began issuing a number of pardons to former confederates
and ordered General Oliver Otis Howard, commissioner of the Freedmen's
Bureau, to issue a circular restoring land to the pardoned Southerners.2
4
Fewer African Americans were able to settle lands under the Southern
Homestead Act than the Act's early supporters had envisioned due to the
fact that the final bill permitted anyone to apply for land who claimed that
he had not supported the Confederacy. By one estimate, seventy-seven per-
cent of the applicants under the Southern Homestead Act were white, and
black applicants faced additional hurdles of discrimination in their efforts to
obtain or to maintain government homesteads.
25
African Americans throughout the South overcame obstacles to land
acquisition by demonstrating what can only be described as heroic action.
African Americans acquired fifteen million acres of land in the South be-
tween Emancipation and 1910 almost completely through private purchase,
overcoming discriminatory credit practices, violence perpetuated by anti-
black groups, and the refusal of many whites to sell to black people. 2 6 In
the agricultural sector, where the overwhelming number of black landown-
ers were concentrated, black farm owners constituted 16.5% of all southern
landowners by 19 10.127 It must be noted, however, that African Americans
were never permitted to purchase any significant amount of prime real es-
tate; for the most part, black people could buy land in "areas with less fer-
tile soil, perhaps tucked away in the hills, not too close to the main
highways or railroads, nor to white schools or churches."'
128
B. Factors Undercutting Black Landownership After 1916
These remarkable gains in black landownership in the rural South (the
poor quality of the land notwithstanding) have almost been wiped out. At
the end of the twentieth century, African Americans in the region were losing
land almost as rapidly as their forbearers acquired it at the beginning of the
122 Id. at 158.
121 Id. at 161.
124 See id. at 159.
125 MICHAEL L. LANZA, AGRARIANISM & RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS: THE SOUTHERN HOME-
STEAD ACT 88-89 (1990).
126 See Peggy G. Hargis, Beyond the Marginality Thesis: The Acquisition and Loss of Land by Afrl.
can Americans in Georgia, 1880-1930, in 72 AGRIC. HIST., 241, 242 (1998); see also SCHWENINGER,
supra note 99, at 145-46, 151-52. Not only did many African Americans who tried to acquire land face
violence, but some whites who sold land to African Americans were threatened with violence from other
whites for what were considered unpatriotic acts. See RANSOM & SuTCH, supra note 110, at 86.
127 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA 21 (1982)
[hereinafter THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING].
128 Id. at 22-23.
From Reconstruction to Deconstniction
century. One study estimates that of the fifteen million acres of land that
black people acquired between 1865 and 1910, hardly any land remains under
the ownership of the original black families who once owned the land.1
29
Fewer than three million acres of land are currently owned by rural African
Americans in fanning irrespective of when such land was acquired. 30  The
dwindling number of black-operated farms today are concentrated in the
southeastern states within the Black Belt' 3' and in Texas, Oklahoma, and
California.
132
Black land loss closely tracks the steep decline of black farmers since
1920, a phenomenon the recently settled class action lawsuit filed by black
farmers against the USDA brought to national attention in the past year. In
1920, black farm owners accounted for one out of every seven farms in the
United States; today these farms account for less than one percent of all
U.S. farms. 33 Overall, the number of black farmers has decreased from a
high of 925,708 in 1920, when one in four black farmers owned their own
land,134 to approximately 18,000 today-a ninety-eight percent decline.
35
The number of white farmers has declined as well but the rate of decline of
black farmers far outpaces that of white farmers. 1 6 Even in 1870, just five
129 THEIMPACTOFHEIRPROPERTY, supra note 15, at 100.
130 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the exact amount of black
landownership is difficult to ascertain precisely because most estimates rely in part on agricultural cen-
sus data. This data is problematic for many reasons. Sce THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note
15, at 19-2 1; see also THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMIING, supra note 127, at 2 n.3. Due to the methodo-
logical problems in calculating the precise number of acres under black landownership, there has been
some conflict in the literature of black land loss as to the precise amount of black landholdings. For exam-
ple, in 1973, one commentator estimated that blacks in the rural South owned only six million acres of land.
See generally ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES, supra note 23. A different study issued II years later concluded
that there were "9,257,311 acres of black-owned rural land in the southeastern states." THE IMPACT OF
HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 61.
131 Strictly speaking, the Black Belt refers to the region, not the people, in the southeastern portion
of the country that has fertile, dark soil. THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 18.
132 COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, THE MINORITY FARMER A DISPEARING ArnsUCAN RE-
SOURCE; HAS THE FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION ACT BEEN THE PRIMARY CATALYSt., H.R. REP. No.
101-984, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter THE MINORITY FARMER: A DISAPPEARING AMERICAN RESOURCE].
133 Id.
134 Marable, supra note 108, at 15. Of the approximately 888,000 black-operated farms in 1910,
175,000 were fully owned and another 43,000 were partially owned. The remaining black-operated
farms in 1910 were sharecropped. Id.
135 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 13, at 25. The number of white farmers also de-
creased significantly between 1920 and 1992; however, the rate of decline of 65% for white farmers in
this period still pales in comparison to the rate of decline of black farmers. Spencer D. Wood & Jess
Gilbert, Re-entering African-American Farmers: Recent Trends and a Policy Rationale 2 (unpublished
paper, on file with author).
136 For example between 1982 and 1987, the percentage of black-owned farms declined by 31% at
the same time that the percentage of white-owned farms declined by 6.6%. Sec I NAT'L AGRIC.
STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 1987 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, FT. 51, U.S. SUMMARY AND
STATE DATA 20-21, app. A-7 (1987).
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years after the end of the Civil War, there were close to 29,000 black farm
owners in the South.'3
With the age distribution of black farmers heavily tilted towards older
farmers, the future of black farmers in America looks worse, assuming that
is possible. The 1997 agricultural census counted only 745 black farmers
under thirty-five years of age nationwide, most of them concentrated in the
Southern states. These young farmers comprised just four percent of all
black farmers. 38  Black farmers who were seventy years or older consti-
tuted the largest group of black farmers, representing twenty-four percent of
the total. 39 Overall, the average age of black farmers was the highest of
any identified group of farmers, whether minority or white. 1
40
General economic shifts in the agricultural industry have squeezed out
many small farmers--4he group in which most black farmers are concen-
trated. 41 The few remaining black farmers face the additional threat of be-
ing forced out of farming due to continued discrimination by the USDA.
Applications for farm credit and other benefits available under the USDA
are approved or denied by county committees of local farmers.142 Federal
regulations mandate that those eligible to elect commissioners to the three-
to five-member county committees and those eligible to be elected must
possess an interest in a farm either as an owner, operator, tenant, or share-
cropper. 43  Paralleling the small percentage of black farmers nationally,
there are only thirty-seven African American county commissioners out of
8,148 county commissioners nationwide.144
The settlement of the Pig/ord class action resulted in no substantive
changes to the federal mechanism of loan determinations that vests so much
power in local commissioners. 145 Given the historic and stubborn refusal of
137 See SCHWENINGER, supra note 99, at 164, 174.
138 See 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 13, at 26.
139 See id.; see also Jerry Thomas, Black Farmers" Battle Reaps Bitter Harvest, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7,
1997, § 1, at I (discussing the difficulty the last full-time, black owner-operator of a farm in Kankakee
County, Illinois, has had farming and trying to pass his farming operation onto another black farmer to
continue the enterprise).
140 See 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 13, at 24, 26.
141 See id. at 25. The 1997 census indicates that 77% of black farmers had agricultural sales of less
than $10,000 and 86% of these farmers had sales ofless than $20,000. Id.
142 Selection and Function of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee, 7 C.F.R. § 7
(2000).
143 Id. §§ 7.5(a)-(b), 7.15.
144 See CRAT Report, supra note 14, at 19. The representation of other minority farmers on county
commissions tracks the meager representation of black farmers. In 1994, minorities accounted for 4.7%
of those eligible to vote for county committee seats; however, just 2.9% of the county commissioners
elected in 1994 were minorities. Id. at 20.
145 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 110 (D.D.C. 1999). The court stated:
The Consent Decree does not, however, provide any forward-looking injunctive relief. It does not
require the USDA to take any steps to ensure that county commissioners who have discriminated
against class members in the past are no longer in the position of approving loans. Nor does it
provide a mechanism to ensure that future discrimination complaints are timely investigated and
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these commissioners to treat black farmers fairly, even after repeated fed-
eral studies over the past decades documented blatant discrimination against
black farmers by USDA officials and county commissioners, 14 6 disparity in
government support for black farmers is likely to recur despite the settle-
ment of the Pigford lawsuit. In fact, at the same time the government was
settling the Pigford lawsuit, black farmers in Arkansas and Georgia claimed
that commissioners in five county offices in the two states improperly de-
nied black farmers disaster assistance. 147 One phenomenon has remained
constant since the first government reports highlighted discrimination
against black farmers over thirty years ago-the number of black farmers
has declined after each report has been issued. In fact, whereas the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights reported that there were only 57,271 black
farm operators in 1982,148 the 1997 census reports that there are currently
just 18,451 black farm operators in the country.149 Even if discrimination is
uprooted, policies designed to support all small farmers--white and minor-
ity--must be implemented in order to renew the prospects for small farmers
who have not prospered under this country's agricultural policy over the
past half century. 50
resolved so that the USDA does not practice the same discrimination against African American
farmers that led to the filing of this lawsuit. In fact, the Consent Decree stands absolutely mute on
two critical points: the full implementation of the recommendations of the Civil Rights Action
Team and the integration and reform of the county committee system to make it more accountable
and representative. The absence of any such provisions has led to strong, heart-felt objections. It
also has caused the Court concern.
Id.
146 Although the Pigford lavsuit filed by black farmers helped reveal the widespread and systematic
discrimination within the federal farm program, the allegations of discrimination that formed the basis of
the lawsuit have a long history and were well-documented in many reports dating back to at least 1965.
See, e.g., CRAT Report, supra note 14; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FARM PROGRAMS: EFFORTS TO
ACHIEVE EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MINORITY FARMERS (1997); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MINORITIES AND WOMEN ON FARM COMMrTEES (1995); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGruC., EVALUATION REP. No. 50801-5-Hg, IMPLEMENTATION OF OIG's RECOM.iENDATIONS-
DEPARTMENT'S CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT SYSTEM AND THE DIRECT FARM LOAN PROGRAM (1998);
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FARM PROGRAMS (1965) (finding discrimina-
tion in the USDA's Farmers Home Administration, Cooperative Extension Service. Soil Conservation
Service, and Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service); THE DECLINE OF BLACK FA'.1ING,
supra note 127; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT To ENSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS (1996); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., REPORT OF
THE USDA TASK FORCE ON BLACK FARM OWNERSHIP (1983); THE MINORITY FARMER: A DISAPPEAR.
ING AMERICAN RESOURCE, supra note 132 (1990); Decline of Minority Farming in the United States:
Hearing Before the Government Information, Justice, and Agricultural Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 101st Cong. (1990); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Cycle to Nowhere.
CLEARINGHOUSE PUB. No. 14 (1970).
147 Disaster Aid Denied, BlackFarmers Charge, CHI. TRi., Aug. 11, 1999, § 1, at 13.
148 THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING, supra note 127, at 1.
149 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 13, at25.
150 Wendell Berry, Failing Our Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at A17 (stating that "farm com-
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Members of the Pigford class have publicly voiced concern about an
issue even more fundamental than the issue of whether African American
farmers will survive. They believe the actions of the USDA and its state
agents have been designed to strip away the diminishing number of acres
under black ownership in rural America. 51 Some believe the USDA par-
ticipated in a conspiracy to take land from black farmers. 52 Others say the
refusal to restore land lost as a direct result of the USDA's acknowledged
discrimination amounts to an intentional choice to dispossess black farmers
of their land. At root, these allegations reflect the view that black-owned
rural land is a political and not just cultural or economic heritage. Without
land, they fear African Americans will have less power to build communi-
ties and to exercise the range of activities associated with full citizenship in
a democracy.
There are other factors behind the raw numbers indicating a historic
decline in the numbers of black landowners in the rural South, including
African American migration patterns in this century. As blacks left the
South, the splintering up of families contributed to less secure common
ownership of real property in the region. Ironically, at the peak of black
landownership and farming in the South in 1910, large numbers of African
Americans began migrating out of the South. This "Great Migration" con-
tinued through the 1960s and fundamentally redistributed the black popula-
tion of the country. 153 In 1900, ninety percent of black people lived in the
151 The author attended the "3rd National Black Land Loss Summit" held in Durham, North Caro-
lina, in February 1999, which was sponsored by the Black Farmers and Agriculturists Association. A
number of conference participants were also members of the Pigford class. These members almost uni-
formly expressed their opposition to the then proposed and now final settlement of the lawsuit because it
provides little assistance to black farmers who seek to recover land lost as a direct result of the USDA's
discrimination. The concerns this author heard mirror the concerns that black farmers expressed
throughout the country in listening sessions held by the USDA's Civil Rights Action Team. See CRAT
Report, supra note 14, at 14.
152 Id. The CRAT Report makes this clear:
Many minority and limited-resource farmers believe that USDA has participated in a conspiracy to
take their land. They cite as proof the severe decline in farm ownership by minorities, especially
African American farmers, in the last 70 years. Much of this land had been owned for generations,
in some cases acquired by these farm families after slavery was abolished in the 1860's.
Id.
153 Initially, "The Great Migration" referred to the migration of black people out ofthe South during
and soon after World War I. More generally, the term has also been used to capture the migration of
blacks out of the South during and after World War II. Stewart E. Tolnay, The Great Migration and
Changes in the Northern Black Family, 1940 to 1990, 75 Soc. FORCES 1213, 1214 (1997). Between
1910 and 1920, 525,000 African Americans migrated out of the South; in the 1920s, 877,000 African
Americans left the South. REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE
QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 113 (1987). Prior to 1910, blacks had migrated out of the South in much
smaller numbers. In the 1870s, 70,000 left; in theI880s, 80,000 left; in the 1890s, 174,000 left; and be-
tween 1900 and 1910, 197,000 more left. The doubling of the numbers of blacks migrating out of the
region in the period between 1890 and 1910 as compared to the period between 1870 and 1890 has been
attributed, in part, to the increasing use of blacks as strikebreakers in northern labor disputes. DOUGLAS
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South;154 by 1980, the percentage had declined to fifty percent.'55  Various
push and pull factors encouraged blacks to leave the South in large numbers
during the World War I period. With the onset of war in 1914, northern
factories expanded their production; at the same time, the cheap supply of
labor from southern and eastern Europe dried up. 56 During the same pe-
riod, beginning in 1906 in Louisiana and moving to Mississippi in 1913 and
to Alabama in 1916, the Mexican boll weevil wreaked havoc on the south-
ern cotton crop. 157  The appearance of the boll weevil coincided with a
plunge in the price of cotton and a series of floods that hit the South in 1915
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMEICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKI.G OF THE
UNDERCLASS 28 (1993).
154 Tolnay, supra note 153, at 1214; see generally FARLEY & ALLEN, supra note 153, at 110-13.
155 Nick Clooney, Black Americans 771t Southward, CIN. POST, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al. Interestingly
enough, the demographic trends have now shifted, and more black people are currently migrating to the
South than to any other region in the country. In 1988, the proportion of African Americans living in
the South increased to 56% from a low of 52% in 1980. See Barbara Vobejda, In Turn Back Blacks
Moving to the South; Dramatic Shift Reflects Econom) Racial Mood WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at
A3. Further, between 1990 and 1995, 375,000 black people moved into the South, doubling the number
that had moved in during the prior five-year period. Id. According to William Frey, a demographer at
the University of Michigan, the South was the only region in the country where more black people
moved in than migrated out between 1990 and 1995. Id. The regional net black migration numbers be-
tween 1990 and 1995 are as follows: Midwest -106,500; West -28,700; Northeast -233,600; and South
368,800. Id. In a stark reversal of sentiment, many African Americans now find the South more so-
cially progressive than the North. Id.
Analysis of demographic distribution patterns in the past century for Native Americans and African
Americans reveals some interesting correlations. Just as 90% of African Americans lived in the South
in 1900, 90% of Native Americans lived in rural areas as recently as 1930. See NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CHANGING NUMBERS, CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN INDIAN DEM.OGRAPHY AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 21 (Gary D. Sandefur et al. eds., 1996). By comparison, in 1930, a little more than halfofall
other Americans lived in urban areas. Id. By 1990, slightly more than 50% of the Native American
population resided in urban areas. Id. at 37. Just as African Americans first came north in large num-
bers due to the outbreak of World War I, World War II served as the primary "pull" factor that drew Na-
tive Americans out of rural areas in large numbers. Id. at 22. Twenty-five thousand Native Americans
served in the military during World War 11, and another fifty thousand were employed in war-related
industries. Id. A higher percentage of Native Americans fought in World War If than did any other eth-
nic minority group in America, and many of these Native Americans enthusiastically volunteered for
military service. DONALD L. FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-
1960, at 4, 6 (1986). Furthermore, Native Americans invested 17 million dollars in =r bonds and sup-
ported the war effort in many other sacrificial ways. Id. In contrast to the oppressive racist conditions
that caused many African Americans to seek a better life in the North during the years of-'The Great
Migration," the federal policy of"termination and relocation" served as the predominant "push" factor
that drove an increasingly large number of Native Americans to urban areas from approximately 1950 to
the mid-1970s. The policy of"termination and relocation" served as the official federal Native Ameri-
can policy from 1950-1975. An estimated 100,000 Native Americans relocated to cities between 1952
and 1972. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 22. Although the rural-urban migration trends for
Native Americans have not reversed as dramatically as for African Americans, the Native American mi-
gration pattern appeared to reach an equilibrium in approximately 1970, at roughly the same time that
the out-migration of blacks from the South came to a halt. See id. at 23, 38.
156 Tolnay, supra note 153, at 1214; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 153, at 28-29.
157 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 153, at 29.
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and 1916.158 These natural devastations led southern planters to shift their
production to food crops and livestock that required fewer tenant farmers
and day laborers.
59
As once relatively unified African American families dispersed, those
who remained in the region and in possession of family agricultural land
and those who left sometimes came to value their common property hold-
ings differently. Unfortunately, the legal rules governing tenancies in
common in conjunction with intestacy rules do not distinguish between
family members who disperse and lose all meaningful connection to the
land and those who maintain meaningful ties to the land. As noted before,
many migrants who left the region during the Great Migration and their de-
scendants unwittingly have sold their interests in land in the South to land
speculators who then initiate legal proceedings that force a sale of the entire
family's landholdings. The distant relatives geographically removed from
the land are almost never cognizant that the fractional interests they sell will
be used as a lever to force their distant relations off of family land.
III. IMPORTANCE OF MINORITY LANDOWNERSHIP VALIDATED BY
THEORY AND CASE STUDIES
History has demonstrated that for countless African Americans, land
has not been merely a fungible commodity. Black landownership has pro-
vided important benefits to the record and nonrecord owners, as well as to ex-
tended families and to the African American community at large. Though
many of the positive attributes of such ownership are not captured well by
economic models that only measure value in terms of individual wealth
maximization, studies employing a richer set of measures have demonstrated
that landownership for African Americans has had significant, measurable ef-
fects. To borrow language from classical economics, landownership has had
multiplier effects for the African American community. These positive bene-
fits include evidence of increased levels of political participation, education,
and psychological well-being.
A. Visions of Participatory Democracy in a Racially Mixed Society
Although emancipated from slavery over one hundred years ago, Afri-
can Americans never have realized the full benefits of citizenship as meas-
ured by the ability to participate meaningfully and equally in the political
and economic life of the country. Undeniably, the history of struggle has
been dynamic and uneven. There have been periods in which African
Americans as a group, often with the assistance of others committed to so-
cial justice, have acquired greater social capital and thereby improved their
social and economic status. Yet, in other periods of retrenchment, the wider
158 Id.
159 Id.
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society has scaled back its commitment to bringing African Americans into
the mainstream of American life.
Iris Marion Young asserts that participatory democracy has both in-
strumental and intrinsic value. Instrumentally, involvement in the political
life of their communities is the best way for citizens to express their views
and to ensure that their interests are not crowded out by others.1l 9 In terms
of the intrinsic value of democracy, Young draws upon the work of Rous-
seau and John Stuart Mill to emphasize the development of human capaci-
ties for self-government and social relation:
Having and exercising the opportunity to participate in making collective deci-
sions that affect one's actions or the conditions of one's actions fosters the de-
velopment of capacities for thinking about one's own needs in relation to the
needs of others, taking an interest in the relation of others to social institutions,
reasoning and being articulate and persuasive, and so on. Only such participa-
tion, moreover can give persons a sense of active relation to social institutions
and processes.
In the past half century, those fighting to change the persistent subor-
dinate status of African Americans have worked hard to develop mecha-
nisms that would provide African Americans with a greater ability to
participate meaningfully in electoral politics. Elections and voting rights,
however, have not always been the central strategy for empowerment
within the American black community. Since Emancipation, black leaders
have advanced sometimes conflicting strategies to promote the group's up-
liftment, with the primary conflict being between integration and nationalist
or self-determination strategies.
In the nineteenth century, Frederick Douglass contended that black
Americans had no desire to form their own state or to return to Africa; once
freed, he believed black Americans would be quickly assimilated into the
mainstream of society. 62 By contrast, Martin Delany, the leading black na-
tionalist of that time, maintained that any free people needed to be part of
the group that ruled society. He believed that entrenched racism would
prevent black people from ever joining the ruling elite in America. There-
fore, at one stage of his career Delany encouraged black people in America
to emigrate to Central and South America, as well as to the West Indies.
163
In terms of individual hopes and aspirations, following Emancipation, most
freed slaves wanted to become landowners even more than they desired vot-
160 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 91 (1990).
161 Id. at 92.
162 Frederick Douglass, The Future of the Colored Race, rcprintcd in IV LIFE AND WRmNGS 193-
96 (Phillip S. Foner ed., 1950).
163 See MARTIN ROBISON DELANY, THE CONDITION, ELEVATION, EMIGRATION. AND DESTINY OF
THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (william Loren Katz ed., Amo Press & New York
Times 1968) (1852).
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ing rights or education.I 64 Landownership meant economic security and
self-determination.
The conflicting ideologies of nationalists and integrationists converged
during the civil rights movement and especially with the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.165 Black people along a wide ideological spec-
trum embraced the view that fundamental change in the social and eco-
nomic agenda of the country could be achieved through the ballot box.
Many assumed that increased voting in the black community would result
in the election of more black officials, who in turn would be the engines of
political transformation. 166 The optimism of the civil rights movement has
not borne out its hoped-for results, for despite the energy that African
Americans invested in trying to reshape the political system, African
Americans continue to be severely underrepresented in politics.
Under democratic principles, it is unjust when minorities do not play a
substantial role in the political decision-making process. Yet, the American
liberal tradition, individualistic in theory, views politics as concerning the
relationship between an individual and the state, "with little or no room for
groups in-between, other than as transient outgrowths of the combination of
individual interests."'' 67 This individualistic focus provides little space for
group-level concerns of minorities,168 which explains the resistance to open-
ing up the American political system through mechanisms such as propor-
tional representation or cumulative voting that would empower groups.
169
Lani Guinier was pilloried by conservatives in politics and the media for
simply suggesting that some alternative voting system, such as one based
on cumulative voting-a commonly used voting mechanism in many corpo-
rations that protects the interests of minority shareholders-should be
adopted to allow racial minorities to participate more effectively in politics.
Majority groups often argue that granting rights to minority groups qua
groups will fragment the national fabric and undermine national unity.
170
Perhaps with this in mind, John Stuart Mill claimed it would be "next to
impossible" for real democracy to flourish in an ethnically diverse soci-
164 RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 131-32
(1993).
165 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 45 (1994).
166 The assumption that black elected officials as a group would push through programs that would
result in fundamental social and economic change, which would inure to the benefit of the wider black
community, has not been bome out in many instances. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1448 (1991).
167 Will Kymlicka & Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in NOMOS XXXIX 6 (lan Shapiro & Will Kym-
licka eds., 1997).
168 HANNUM, supra note 20, at 56.
169 See generally HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (providing a thor-
ough analysis of the societal meaning of representation from an historical viewpoint as well as from a
political viewpoint).
170 HANNUM, supra note 20, at 71.
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ety.171 Mill's solution was to argue that a country's boundaries be drawn
along ethnic lines and that national minorities be granted the right to se-
cede. 172 Obviously, these are not realistic alternatives for ethnically plural-
istic western societies. The project for modem democracies is to learn to
thrive on heterogeneity.
Faith in assimilation has triumphed at the level of constitutional princi-
ple. However, not only has the United States steered away from recogniz-
ing minority group rights, but the government has also demonstrated only a
lukewarm commitment to eradicating discrimination against individual mi-
nority group members. 173 Despite noticeable gains since the 1960s, for ex-
ample, African Americans today hold less than two percent of elected
offices throughout the country. 174 To a striking degree, large portions of the
American landscape remain geographically segregated by race. In fact,
Douglass Massey and Nancy Denton have shown that racial segregation of
housing has worsened in the twentieth century. One-third of African
Americans live in areas so intensely segregated that they are almost com-
pletely isolated from other groups in society, rendering them amongst "the
most isolated people on earth."'7
B. Landownership Considered Vital to Promoting a
Participatory Democracy
Just as participatory democracy has both instrumental and intrinsic
value, an enduring liberal political tradition sees landownership as a vehicle
for human development and not just an instrument for economic develop-
ment. 76 Yet, the structure of the common law tenancy in common is un-
democratic. Minority interest holders may terminate the tenancy against the
wishes of the majority interest holders. In these instances, the minority in-
terest holders have more power than their proportional share of the tenancy
suggests is fair. Although many property theorists connect property rights
and political and economic participation in society, few have specifically
considered how greater landownership by minorities might make democ-
racy more inclusive.
171 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNmENT 361 (EP.
Dutton 1929).
172 Id. at 362,366.
173 HANNUM, supra note 20, at 56.
174 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 117, at 24.
175 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 153, at 77.
176 See Robert Browne, The Plight of Black Ownership, 2 S. Ex POSURE 112, 115 (1974); sce also
Winston P. Nagan, Resource Allocation: Land and Human Rights in a New South Africa (July 1993)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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John Locke maintained that property ownership is essential to civil so-
ciety.'7 7 People enter into political or civil societies primarily to preserve
property, he argued, defined in this context as "Lives, Liberties and Es-
tates." ' 8 Elsewhere, Locke asserted that the "chief matter of property is the
Earth itself," that is, land. 79 Locke's theory of the social compact assumes
that those with valuable material possessions-most importantly
land-have the strongest incentive to enter into agreements to establish
governments because of their desire to preserve their property. Further-
more, once governments are formed, people should retain their property if
civil society is to serve its ends. Locke asserts:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of His property with-
out his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Gov-
ernment, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes
and requires, that the People should have Property, without which they must
be suppos'd to lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which
they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore
in Society having Property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the
Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath a right to take their sub-
stance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; without this,
they have no Property at all.1
80
Ownership, therefore, also means having a stake in sustaining a viable po-
litical sphere.
Locke qualified the right to private property in two ways. First, an in-
dividual's right to property should be subject to the principle that there must
be "enough, and as good left in common for others."' 8  Second, an individ-
ual ought not to take more property that he can use.8 2 Even so, Locke's
principal interest lay in setting forth moral and philosophical arguments to
support the right to private property and his ideas were used by Anglo-
American politicians to support the property rights of the rich, irrespective
of these provisos. 8 3 Moreover, Locke's arguments about property address
the conditions under which individuals initially acquire property rights that
become subject to governmental protection, but do not ask whether the dis-
tribution of property at any moment in time reflects the fact that different
177 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 110 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 3d. ed. 1967) (1698) (stating that only "owning property ... can give a man permanent member-
ship of society").
178 Id. § 123, at 368. In the Second Treatise, Locke at times uses both a more materialistic defini.
tion of property and the more expansive definition referred to above.
179 Id. § 32, at 308-09.
180 Id. § 138, at 378.
181 Id. 27, at 306.
182 Id. 30, at 308.
183 A. Whitney Griswold, The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson, 40 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
657, 675 (1946).
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individuals and groups possess unequal power to acquire property in the
first instance.t14
Locke's political theory of property powerfully influenced the framers
of the United States Constitution, as well as early American jurists.185
Thomas Jefferson, for example, fully accepted Locke's view of the sanctity
of private property rights. 8 6 Jefferson, however, was relatively more con-
cerned about democratic principles than Locke was, a concern that shaped
his civic republican view of the proper distribution of land. According to
republicans, democracy works best if citizens are both enlightened and in-
dependent. For Jefferson, private property was "a corollary to democracy"
because landownership allowed men to achieve economic security and to
develop self-reliance.18 7 Believing that the "small land holders are the most
precious part of a state,"'88 Jefferson thought that as many men as possible
should own land. Jefferson's argument for widely distributed property is
also linked to his view of the good society. Agriculture, for Jefferson, held
sociological and moral value that was even more important than its eco-
nomic value. 8 9 Freed from the corrupting influence of industry and com-
merce, rural smallholds could help develop virtues that would protect the
moral fiber of the country and ensure its longevity.
90
One hundred fifty years later in his 1935 book Black Reconstntction,'
9 '
W.E.B. Du Bois focused upon the failure of the government to allocate land
to the newly freed slaves in explaining the failure of Reconstruction to build
a real democracy. The enfranchisement of black people in the South after
the Civil War failed to achieve its liberating potential, he argued, because
white landowners maintained their monopoly of land. 92 Although black
people used their political power to establish public school systems, Du
Bois asserted that "universal suffrage could not function without personal
freedom, land and education."' 93 As a socialist thinker, Du Bois considered
the popular black demand for private ownership of land (and little else) in
the economic realm to be incomplete. 94 Even so, Du Bois believed that
194 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Propery 90
Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1466-68 (1996).
185 See, eg., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).
186 Griswold, supra note 183, at 673. Jefferson was so closely identified with Locke that some of his
detractors accused him of copying Locke's treatises in drafting the Declaration of Independence, Id. at 674.
187 Id. at 672.
188 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprintcd in VIII TIE Papers OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
189 Griswold, supra note 183, at 667.
190 IV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 85-86 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
191 W.E.B. Du Bols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERCA (1935); see also GUNNAR MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 225 (1944) (listing failures of Reconstruction).
192 See Du Bois, supra note 191, at 619.
193 Id. at 585.
194 See id. at 611.
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black people in possession of a land base could achieve a measure of eco-
nomic independence that would give meaning to the right to vote.195 In the
end, according to Du Bois, white resistance to ceding land to blacks,
"spelled for [black people] the continuation of slavery."' 9F
The belief in self-determination underpinning Du Bois's philosophy
was echoed thirty years later during the height of the civil rights struggle.' 97
Leaders of the Black Power movement challenged the agendas of white lib-
erals and black civil rights leaders as misguided. Single-minded efforts to
increase social welfare spending as a means to achieve social upliftment for
black people would fall short, they predicted. Instead, they argued that
black people should work towards self-determination, not just increased
participation in mainstream politics. And they believed that more energy
should be spent developing and supporting black institutions controlled by
black people. 98  Important among these were economic institutions that
could assure autonomy, just as Du Bois had argued.
C. Case Studies Demonstrate the Link Between Landownership
and Participation
The political theories of "democratic property" have been tested in so-
cial science case studies that document the links between land and many
measures of community well-being and empowerment. Complex social
networks develop around particular pieces of land for communities defined
by continuity rather than mobility. Thus, land and place are important to
working class and poor, minority communities in ways not common to mo-
bile, middle class communities.'" One study of a working class, Italian-
American community in the West End of Boston displaced in an urban re-
development project underscores the point that certain groups associate sta-
ble property rights with their ability to maintain a healthy sense of group
identity. Not only were complex sets of social networks localized within
195 Id. at 624.
196 Id. at 611.
197 See generally STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS
OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA (1967).
198 Id. at 46. Notwithstanding the radical, public image of the leaders of the black power movement,
the economic philosophy underpinning many of the programs advocated by some of the movement's lead-
ers echoed the view ofmany liberal whites during the Reconstruction period one hundred years earlier. See
MYRDAL, supra note 191, at 226-27 (noting that a liberal, southern white politician believed that after
emancipation black people should have been given land instead of being turned over without an economic
base "to the mercy of Republican politicians, white and black, who made political sl ves ofthem").
199 E.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 362 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966) [hereinafter
Fried, Grieving]; Marc Fried & Peggy Gleicher, Some Sources of Residential Satisfaction in an Urban
Slum, 27 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 305, 311 (1961) [hereinafter Fried & Gleicher, Residential Satisfac-
tion]; Ernest Norton Tooby, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to Full In-
demnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801, 814 (1969).
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the particular area of the West End from which the residents were dis-
placed, but most residents also considered the entire area "as an extension
of home" and constructed their identity around this extended home.
20 9
Social science studies demonstrate that in African American communi-
ties, too, landownership promotes community well-being. Landownership. . . . 201
has been correlated with increased civic participation, psychological
well-being,202,and an enhanced sense of community.20 3 One study of black
landowners in Hancock County, Georgia, revealed that the children of black
landowners attended school for significantly more years than the children of
black or white sharecroppers in the county.204  Landownership can also
benefit families and communities regardless of any measurable economic
benefits to particular individuals. 20 5 Even those extended community mem-
bers who "return home" only periodically may draw psychological strength
from the very existence of the rooted community.20 6 But because those who
own land have greater security than those who rent or work for wages, fam-
ily landholdings may induce more family members to remain in relative
proximity to one another. The land itself can provide the base upon which
to build institutions geared to community development. 20 7 This focus on
land as a base for community infrastructure extrapolates from the classical
liberal view that landownership is uniquely important to the protection of
individual liberty interests. To this end, Robert Ellickson has stated:
"Compared to other resources, land remains a particularly potent safeguard
of individual liberty. Like no other resource, land can provide a physical
haven to which a beleaguered individual can retreat."' 08 Just as land can
shelter the "beleaguered individual," it can provide a physical base for
groups trying to improve their collective lot.
As indicated, families that own land often build mutually beneficial
support systems based around the land. One study comparing differences in
200 Fried & Gleicher, Residential Satisfaction, supra note 199, at 315.
201 LESTER M. SALAMON, LAND AND MINORITY ENTERPRISE: THE CRISIS AND TIE OPPORTUNITY
42-44 (1976).
202 Cf. Fried, Grieving, supra note 199, at 377 (discussing postrelocation depression suffered by
those relocated due to urban renewal projects).
203 Lisa Groger, Tied to Each Other Through 77es to the Land. Informal Support of Black Elders in
a Southern U.S. Communiy, 7 J. CROSS-CULTURAL GERoNTOLOGY 205 (1992); see also SALAMON,
supra note 201, at 29-53; Browne, supra note 176, at 121.
204 Mark L Schulte, The Dream Realized?: African American Landownership in Central Georgia
Between Reconstruction and World War Two, 72 AGRIC. HIST. 298, 307 (1998).
205 Cf. Fried, Grieving. supra note 199, at 365-66 (discussing the benefits and harm resulting from
pre- and post-relocation); Fried & Gleicher, ResidentialSatisfaction. supra note 199, at 315.
206 THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER, supra note 23, at xviii; see also Fried, Grieving, supra note
199, at 363; Frank G. Progue, The Mobile Black Family: Sociological Implications, in THE BLACK RURAL
LANDOWNER, supra note 23, at 25,36 ("Landownership ... becomes important because it provid-s an eco-
nomic base for sociopsychological release and/or identification even for blacks who have migrated.").
207 Groger, supra note 203, at 209.
208 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1353 (1993).
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the systems of informal support between equally poor, landowning and
landless elderly black people in the Piedmont region of North Carolina
demonstrated that a greater percentage of the children of sharecroppers
moved far away from their parents (often to northern cities) than did the
children of landowners. 20 9 The elderly sharecroppers were more often left
to fend for themselves. 210 By contrast, over two-thirds of the landed house-
holds in the case study lived on "compounds" in which children or other
relatives resided on the land itself or in the immediate vicinity. In these
compounds, the relatives and the black elders established "reciprocal ex-
change relationships" that benefited each person tied to the land in some
meaningful way.
In addition to particular rural black families, whole communities of Af-
rican Americans have been strengthened through landownership. Dating
back to the early days after the Civil War, groups of African American
families and individuals formed rural land collectives either on their own or
with the assistance of the government. For example, freedmen in Hampton,
Virginia formed the Lincoln's Land Association and cooperatively pur-
chased hundreds of acres of land that groups of families then collectively
worked. 211 During the Great Depression, the Resettlement Administration
and the Farm Security Administration established several rural communities
for destitute, low-income families.2 1 If measured by a survivorship rate,
the African American communities were not particularly successful; most
did not last even a generation. Yet, these communities greatly improved the
opportunities of the individuals involved. According to Lester Salamon,
many poor tenants (through lease-purchase agreements) gained the chance
to become landowners in the newly created communities replete with
schools, cooperative enterprises, and other community buildings.?2 3 Many
program participants who purchased land expressed increased self-esteem.
214
The landowners were also much more active in their communities than were
tenants as measured by such indicia as relative participation in social and re-
ligious organizations, voter registration, and voting turn-out.
215
The Prairie Farms project in western Alabama is a good example of the
community building potential of land-based communities. The Resettle-
ment Administration designed this program to settle destitute and low-
income tenant families on approximately three thousand acres in Macon
209 Groger, supra note 203, at 209.
210 Id. at 209-10.
211 FONER, supra note 12, at 106.
212 SIDNEY BALDWIN, POVERTY AND POLITICS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE FARM SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION 92, 111-13 (1968).
213 SALAMON, supra note 201, at 31-32.
214 Id. at 41.
215 Id. at 42-43.
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County, Alabama.2t6 Each of the thirty-four families that were settled at
Prairie Farms was provided with a farmstead. The cooperative living at
Prairie Farms "centered on farming, and the education and social activities
that revolved around agriculture. '  The farm families shared livestock for
breeding, set aside a community pasture for common use, and cooperatively
used certain machinery and equipment.
The newly constructed school became a major center of community
life at Prairie Farms. As the first school to provide a high school education
for black students in the surrounding area, the school enrolled 213 students
from the very beginning although it was built with a capacity of just 175
students.218 The school offered the children many enrichment opportunities
including a school newspaper, a student cooperative, and a number of clubs
ranging from 4-H to the nature club.219 Furthermore, the school held adult
education classes focusing on agriculture. 220 The school also doubled as the
community center where meetings, plays, religious services, and public
health programs were held.221
Although many of the African American communities formed by the
Resettlement Administration and the Farm Security Administration did not
endure, one must remember that these projects were started during the Great
Depression, a particularly turbulent period of American history.m  Fur-
thermore, the net cost expended by the government on African American
resettlement communities was so small that Lester M. Salamon has referred
to these resettlement projects as "social reform on the cheap."tm However,
the people who had the opportunity to live within these communities clearly
benefited. As Robert Zabawa and Sarah Warren have stated:
[Prairie Farms] was an exercise in the creation of a community based on
change. There was a change in the relationship to the land-from tenancy and
shares to ownership. There was a change in the relationship to production-
from cotton to diversified farming. There was a change in the economic rela-
tionships-from dependency on the plantation ovner and store to cooperative
216 Robert E. Zabawa & Sarah T. Warren, From Company to Community: Agricultural Communit,
Development in Macon County, Alabama, 1881 to the Ne, Deal, 72 AGRIC. HIST. 459,477 (1998).
217 Id. at 480.
218 Id. at 484.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 485.
221 Id. at 484-85.
222 Id. at486.
23 Lester M. Salamon, The Time Dimension in Policy Evaluated: The Case of the New Deal Land-
Reform Experiments, 27(2) PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1979, at 129, 178. In his study ofsix African American
resettlement projects in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, Salamon indicated that the net
cost per family to the government was $2,273. This compares with the average net cost per family to
the government of $4,379 for all resettlement projects in the United States. BRIAN Q. CANNiO, REvtmAK.
ING THE AGRARIAN DREAM: NEw DEAL AND RURAL SETT.ibENT IN THE MOUNTAIN WEST 151 (1996).
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buying and selling. There was a change in the relationship to education-from
sporadic elementary education to high school level offerings and adult education.
And there was a change in the relationship to community-from cabins scattered
along an eroded wasteland, to new houses in a farming community with a health
and community center. This is what Prairie Farms had to offer.2
The history of federal Native American policy amply demonstrates the
link between Native American social welfare and landholding. With the
passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, Congress shifted its Native American
policy from containing Native Americans within reservations to promoting
assimilation of Native Americans into American society, principally
through transferring huge tracts of Native American land to whites, and
forcing private ownership upon individual Native Americans. 225  Just as
previous, smaller-scale experiments in allotting Native American land had
largely failed to achieve their stated goals, 226 widespread application of the
allotment policy under the Dawes Act devastated many Native American
communities.
Native Americans lost millions of acres of land that were declared sur-
plus under the Dawes Act.228 In addition, two-thirds of all the land allotted
to individual Native Americans under the Dawes Act-roughly twenty-
seven million acres-ended up in non-Indian hands by 1934, mostly by
means of sale, mortgage foreclosure, and tax sale after the restrictions on
alienation initially built into the Dawes Act were stripped away, beginning
with passage of the Burke Act in 1906.229 Although the destruction of
communal tenure and its impact on Native American communities under
the Dawes Act is well-documented, the plight of those Native Americans
who lost their individual allotments was no less damning of the policy. On
most reservations that were allotted under the Act,230 between seventy-five
and one hundred percent of the Native Americans who received fee patents
lost their lands in short measure, and the overwhelming majority of these
224 Zabawa & Warren, supra note 216, at 477.
225 From enactment of the Dawes Act in 1887 to the congressional repudiation of the allotment pol-
icy in 1934, approximately 90 million acres of land passed out of Native American control, COHEN, su-
pra note 53, at 138.
226 Judith Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995).
227 One pair of authors who have reviewed the history of the Indian Claims Commission has stated that
the allotment policy was a "disaster second only to the original onslaught of the Europeans" as it pertained
to Native American cultural integrity. MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE 77 (1997).
228 The federal government appropriated approximately 60 million acres of land from Native
American people under the surplus land provisions of the Dawes Act-38 million in outright cessions
and an additional 22 million under provisions that allowed non-Native Americans to homestead on 44
reservations. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 309 (1977).
229 COHEN, supra note 53, at 138; see also STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 118
(1988).
230 During the allotment period, 118 reservations were allotted. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW
COMMISSION, supra note 228, at 309.
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Native Americans became impoverished.2' At the time of its enactment,
the Dawes Act was lauded as a vehicle to civilize Native Americans
through private property ownership. 2 As land quickly passed out of Na-
tive American hands and these Native Americans slipped into poverty,
however, champions of the allotment policy shifted grounds and adopted a
social Darwinist rationale. Theory believed that impoverished Native
Americans would be forced to learn the value of hard work and earning
money.
233
The Catawba Tribe provides a poignant example of the fundamental
importance of landownership. Prior to contact with white settlers, the Ca-
tawbas occupied a vast tract of land in an area that now constitutes much of
present-day North and South Carolina.2 4  Under the terms of two trea-
ties-executed in 1760 and 1763 respectively--between the tribe and the
King of England, the Catawbas relinquished this territory in exchange for
undisturbed ownership of a 144,000-acre tract of land located within South
Carolina.
After the Revolutionary War, South Carolina yielded to pressures from
land-hungry white settlers and enacted a series of statutes authorizing non-
Indians to lease Catawba land in contravention of the Nonintercourse
Act.235 At the time of the first leases with non-Indians, the Catawbas were
"then strong and felt themselves in their own greatness,"236 but by the
1830s, practically all of the land reserved to the tribe under treaty had been
leased to non-Indians on terms highly disadvantageous to the Catawbas.2
7
Like so many other Native American tribes, the once-strong Catawbas were
reduced to a pathetic shadow of their former selves thirty years after first
transferring some of their property rights to white settlers. In a "state of star-
231 INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINIsTRATtoN 460-61
(Lewis Meriam technical dir., 1928) [hereinafter THE MERIAM REPORT]; JANET A. MCDO.NELL, TIIE
DISPOSSESSION OFTHE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-1934, at 106-07, 112-13 (1991).
232 Royster, supra note 226, at 9.
233 McDONNELL, supra note 231, at 107, 114-15.
234 See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498,500 (1986).
235 Id. at 513-14. The Nonintercourse Act ofMar. 1, 1793, § 8, 1 Stat. 330, is codified as reenacted and
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000). The Nonintercourse Act prohibited any "claims" to protected land in
addition to prohibiting outright purchases of such land by entities other than the federal government.
236 Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 514.
237 Id. ("[R]ents were 'generally paid in old horses, old cows or bed quilts and clothes, at prices that
the whites set on the articles taken."). The Catawbas' land bargain was consistent with the overall ex-
perience of Native American tribes that rarely were given much value for their land cessions or lease
agreements. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES 156-207 (1994); see also
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 325, 339 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., 1969) (stating that "Americans cheaply acquire whole provinces which the richest sovereigns in
Europe could not afford to buy'); H.R. REP., No. 21-227, at 6 (1830) ("Up to the present time so invariable
has been the value of certain causes, first in diminishing the value of forest lands to the Indians, and sec-
ondly in disposing them to sell readily, that the plan of buying their right of occupancy has never threatened
to retard, in any perceptible degree, the prosperity ofany ofthe States:).
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vation and distress," the Tribe finally acquiesced to South Carolina's repeated
efforts to purchase all of their land.23s
Just as the loss of a land base contributed to the demise of the Catawba
Tribe, the Catawbas experienced a resurgence after the Federal govern-
ment-concerned about the tribe's sinking fortunes239-- placed into trust
approximately 3,500 acres of land for their benefit in the 1940S.240 From
the brink of starvation, the Catawbas recovered so rapidly that within fif-
teen years of obtaining a new land base and various other forms of federal
assistance,24 the Government determined that the Catawbas were one of the
twelve tribes242 who were suitable candidates for the withdrawal of federal
assistance and services under the termination policy.243
IV. GROUP OWNERSHIP AND COMMUNITY: THE LAW'S UNEVEN
TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT GROUPS
Though the theoretical link predicted between landownership and en-
hanced minority civic participation has been proven, legal recognition of
the importance of minority landholding to building community and increas-
ing democratic participation has been "fragmentary" at best. Only fed-
238 The Catawba experience is consistent with the experience of those Native Americans who lost
land allotted to them under the Dawes Act. The overwhelming majority of Native Americans who were
not able to maintain ownership of their allotments found themselves in dire poverty. MCDONNELL, su-
pra note 231, at 113.
239 Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 502 n.7. By 1930, the tribe's population had been depleted
by two-thirds, and a Senate subcommittee holding field hearings in South Carolina "'found some hun-
dred and seventy-five remnants of this band located on a tract of practically barren rock and gradually
starving to death."' Id. (quoting from Division of Tribal Assets of Catawba Indian Tribe, Hearings on
H.R. 6128 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
85th Cong. (unpublished), Insert 5, at 3 (Minutes of State and Federal Conference, Oct. 21, 1958), quot-
ing letter from Senator Thomas to Commissioner Rhoads (Feb. 10, 1932)).
240 In addition to placing this land in trust for the Catawbas, the federal government agreed to make
a specified annual monetary contribution to the Tribe and "to assist the Tribe with education, medical
benefits, and economic development." Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 502 n.7.
241 See S. REP. No. 80-863, at 3 (1959) ("The Catawba Indians have advanced economically ...
during the past fourteen years, and have now reached a position that is comparable to their non-Indian
neighbors.").
242 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 1048 (1984).
243 The federal government's Native American policy has been characterized by distinct periods
stamped with underlying ideologies that oscillate back and forth on a spectrum that at one end recog-
nizes the benefits of Native American self-determination to some limited degree and on the other end seeks
to assimilate all Native Americans-physically, spiritually, and culturally-into the majority society. In
marked contrast to the federal government's policy that made allowances for Native American self-
determination during the New Deal, the architects of the termination policy, which was ushered in with the
passage of H.R. Con. Res. 108 on August 1, 1953, believed that Native Americans should completely as-
similate into the majority culture. ROBERTN. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 137-64 (1991).
244 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1006 (1982) (argu-
ing that in takings clause cases there is some fragmentary evidence that suggests courts will give en-
hanced protection to a group's property rights if such group property holdings contribute to ensuring the
group's autonomy or internal integrity). Even in the Native American property context, which is the area in
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eral Native American law explicitly recognizes that promoting landowner-
ship is necessary to self-determination for minority groups who otherwise
face systematic discrimination. Outside of the Native American context,
neither common law nor statutes acknowledge the value of minority land-
ownership.
This Part illustrates the degree to which the law has supported (or not
supported) minority landownership by considering the intersection of mi-
nority landownership and the law in two instances: (I) current federal In-
dian law, and (2) Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. Further, and by
way of comparison, this Part considers the lawfulness of restraints on alien-
ation as they pertain to relatively newer forms of common property. In the
context of condominiums, housing cooperatives, and similar forms of resi-
dential ownership, both statutory and common law permit groups to restrain
individual rights in order to promote "community."
A. Modern Federal Indian Law and Policy Recognizes that Native
American Landownership Promotes Indian Culture and Community
In the past century, federal Indian policy has oscillated between recog-
nition of tribes as sovereign entities with primary responsibility for manag-
ing their resources and attempts to strip Native Americans of their land and
cultural resources, in order to facilitate assimilation.245 The modem policy,
set largely by Congress and each recent president,246 seeks to promote tribal
autonomy. President Lyndon Johnson helped steer away from the assimila-
tionist policies of termination and relocation that predominated in the 1940s
and 1950s. Yet, President Richard Nixon is credited with setting the cur-
rent course, which emphasizes "tribal self-determination, sovereignty, and
control over Native American country."247 President Bill Clinton publicly
supports a "government-to-government" relationship between the United
States and Native American tribes, and Congress now promotes greater
tribal control of Native American land.248
Today, federal Native American policy supports retention of Native
American lands in Native American hands. The roots of this policy lie in the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,249 and the philosophy of John Collier, the
charismatic commissioner of Indian Affairs who served in this role between
which Radin discovers this "fragmentary evidence," the evidence that courts or legislative bodies may limit
a government's eminent domain powers is razor thin. In the African American experience, such evi-
dence-fragmentary or otherwise-does not exist.
245 Royster, supra note 226, at 7-20; Boisclair v. Super. CL of San Diego County, 801 P.2d 305. 310
(Cal. 1990).
246 Royster, supra note 226, at 20.
247 Id. at 19.
248 Id.
249 Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (1994)).
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1933 and 1945.250 In developing a program that became known as the Indian
New Deal,25' Collier drew upon the 1928 Meriam Report.25 2 This report set
forth "in scientific survey style, the staggering degree of poverty, ill health,
poor education, and community disorganization that generally prevailed on
the reservations." 253 The report denounced the allotment program, supported
efforts to strengthen Native American communities, and advocated increased
protection of Native American property rights.254
Consistent with these recommendations, specific provisions of the In-
dian Reorganization Act nullified and reversed the federal government's
century-old mission to assimilate Native Americans by breaking up tribal
property holdings into individual interests.255  The first section of the Act
ends any further allotment of reservations. 6  The second section extends
trust restrictions on allotments indefinitely,257 while the fifth section author-
izes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire additional lands to be put into
trust for Native American tribes.258 Since implementation of these provi-
sions, Native American landholdings have increased moderately.259
Today, Native American land retention is promoted by a number of
federal statutes that subject much of tribal and individually owned land to
restraints on alienation. The Indian Nonintercourse Act,260 25 U.S.C. §
462261 and 25 U.S.C. § 464,262 is among the most important of such stat-
utes.263 Congress even maintained the federal restraints on alienation when
250 CORNELL, supra note 229, at 93.
251 Id.
252 THE MERIAM REPORT, supra note 231.
253 CORNELL, supra note 229, at 90.
254 Id. at 460-61.
255 CORNELL, supra note 229, at 93.
256 Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (2000)).
257 Indian Reorganization Act § 2.
258 Indian Reorganization Act § 5.
259 In addition to land that the government has taken into trust on behalfofNative American tribes,
land has been restored to various tribes through legislative resolution of land claims. The return of
130,000 acres of land to the Pueblo of Taos and the resolution of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot
land claims in Maine (under which each tribe was awarded 150,000 acres of land to be placed into trust)
represent two of the better-known legislative resolutions of Native American land claims. CLINTON ET
AL., supra note 243, at 737.
260 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994). The Nonintercourse Act provides in pertinent part that:
No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made
by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.
Id.
261 25 U.S.C. § 462 (2000).
262 25 U.S.C. § 464 (2000).
263 Boisclair v. Super. CL of San Diego County, 801 P.2d 305, 309 (Cal. 1990).
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it enacted Public Law 280 in 1953 that permitted states to assume civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Native American country.2 4
The rationale for federal restraints on alienation of Native American
land has developed over time. In order to federalize the process of Native
American land cessions, Congress first imposed pervasive restraints on
alienation of Native American land in 1790 in the first of a series of Trade
and Intercourse Acts.265 The 1790 Act was a temporary measure and was
reenacted-also for limited periods-in later years.266 Congress enacted a
permanent Nonintercourse Act in 1802.267 The 1802 Act, as amended, was
largely incorporated in the 1834 Act, the final in the series of such acts.
26 8
Ever since, restraints on alienation of Native American land have been a
cornerstone of federal Native American policy. 269 When restraints on alien-
ation were first established two hundred years ago, Congress was not pri-
marily concerned with slowing the loss of Native American land.270 Tribes
were largely a pawn in a power struggle for supremacy between the federal
government and the states; the shifting of power from the states to the fed-
eral government in the area of Native American affairs represented one step
in the federal government's gradual rise to political supremacy.
271
In this century, courts have construed the Nonintercourse Act and other
restraints on alienation of Native American land as designed to protect Na-
tive Americans from being dispossessed of their land by parties other than
264 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953). Congress carved out an exception to the
offer ofcivil jurisdiction. Section 1360(b) states:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or per-
sonal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or community
that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by
the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use ofsuch property in a manner inconsistent
with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or
shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the
ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.
265 Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137. The 1790 Act provided the following:
That no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the United
States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of preemp-
tion to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty,
held under the authority of the United States.
266 See Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of
Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
267 See Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.
268 See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12,4 Stat. 730.
269 Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on
Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L REV. 17, 19, 38 (1979);
see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237,276 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985); Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,667-70 (1974); United States v. Creek Nation,
295 U.S. 103, 109-11 (1935); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30-31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,591, 604 (1823).
270 Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 269, at 36.
271 Id. at 88.
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the federal government.272 However, judges in earlier cases often consid-
ered whether restraints on alienation of Native American land were applica-
ble in a particular case against the backdrop of "the Government's paternal
policy toward the Indians.2 73 These judges viewed Native Americans as
doltish, incompetent or-at least-incapable of managing their own affairs.
For example, in United States v. Candelaria,274 the Supreme Court consid-
ered, inter alia, whether land owned by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
was subject to federal restraints on alienation. In determining that the lands
owned by the Pueblo in fee simple were subject to the restraints, the Court
first considered the purpose of the statutory restraints, including those set
forth in the Nonintercourse Act. The Court stated that: "Many provisions
have been enacted by Congress-some general and others special-to pre-
vent the Government's Indian wards from improvidently disposing of their
lands and becoming homeless public charges.275
Next, the Court considered whether the Pueblo--who owned their land
in fee simple, unlike many other tribes-were subject to the Nonintercourse
Act by considering whether the Pueblo were capable enough to fend off those
who might dispossess them of their land. The Court viewed the Pueblo as
different from the "nomadic and savage Indians then living in New Mex-
ico, '276 but as markedly inferior to more advanced races. The Court-
reflecting the government's paternalistic attitude at that time-characterized
the Pueblos as follows: "Although sedentary, industrious and disposed to
peace, they are Indians in race, customs and domestic government, always
have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed people,
ill-prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.
27 7
Based on this blatantly racist characterization, the Court determined that the
Pueblos' landholdings were subject to the federal restraints.78
Federal courts no longer claim that restraints on alienation are neces-
sary to protect lowly Native Americans from making improvident deci-
sions. Instead, according to some judges, the restraints remain in place
because policymakers believe that a substantial land base must be main-
272 Cf id. at 37.
273 United States v. Minnesota, 113 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1940).
274 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
275 Id. at 441.
276 Id. at 442.
277 Id. at 441-42.
278 Federal courts demonstrated this same paternal attitude towards individual Indians who held al-
lotments subject to restraints on alienation. In United States v. Debell, 227 F. 775 (8th Cir. 1915), the
Eighth Circuit voided a sale of an allotment from an illiterate Native American woman to a white specu-
lator. The court described the purposes ofthe federal restraints as follows:
The chief purpose and main object of the restriction upon alienation is not to prevent the incompe-
tent Indian from selling his land for a price too low, but to prevent him from selling it at all, to the
end that he shall be prevented from losing, giving away, or squandering its proceeds and thus be
left dependent upon the government or upon charity for his support.
Id.
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tained in order for Native Americans to preserve their culture and for Native
American communities to exercise self-determination. 2 9 In this light, land
represents more than a fungible commodity capable of creating wealth for
individual Native Americans. Native American land is not to be subject to
the full force of the market because it represents a patrimony or political
heritage. As one commentator has stated:
If the only purpose for federal restrictions were to "protect the Indians
from themselves," the character of the restrictions would be transitory, ceasing
when the trust beneficiary had become sufficiently "educated" or "assimilated"
to stand alone. Moreover, there would be less objection to transmuting the
character of the trust; reservation land could be liquidated into money or cor-
porate securities, for example, so long as the Secretary monitored the fairness
of the exchange and continued to administer the new trust corpus to ensure that
no waste occurred. If, rather, the objective of the federal trust responsibility is
to provide a land and resource base for a distinct Indian society as long as
tribes wish to preserve that society, sale of reservation land should not take
place, even at a fair price, or at least should be tightly controlled.
280
Although a great portion of the Native American landholdings remain
subject to federal restraints on alienation, Congress has unilateral power to
remove the restrictions on tribal or individually owned land.281  Native
Americans lost a great deal of land when restrictions were removed during
the allotment era and the termination era. Recently, the Supreme Court has
maintained that congressional transfer of land without restraints on alien-
ation to Alaska Natives indicates that Congress does not value maintaining
these native communities intact. In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government,282 the Supreme Court considered whether the Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government could tax the State of Alaska and a
private contractor for conducting business on tribal land. In order to decide
this issue, the Court had to assess whether the community of Native
Neets'aii Gwich'in in Alaska could be considered to be "dependent Indian
communities" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151283 after passage of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 214  Although the Neets'aii Gwich'in's
279 COHEN, supra note 53, at 509-10; see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 472 U.S. at 278-79
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Boisclair, 801 P.2d at 309. But see United States v. Michigan, 882 F. Supp.
659, 675 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("[Rlestricting the alienability of land based on the status of the titleholder
is founded on the fear of the consequences of outright ownership ... .
280 COHEN, supra note 53, at 509-10.
281 Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 269, at 77.
282 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
283 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Section 1151, in pertinent part, defines "Indian country" as follows:
[Tihe term "Indian country" . . . means (a) all land within the limits ofany Indian resenration undcr
the jurisdiction of the United States Government.... (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory the eof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
284 Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688.
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reservation was revoked in 1971 pursuant to ANCSA, in 1973, two native
corporations formed for the tribe took title to the former reservation land
under a provision in ANCSA that permitted Native corporations to do so,
provided that these corporations would forego the statute's other monetary
payments and land transfers.8 5
Although the Tribe's land was "exempt from adverse possession
claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments as long as it [was] ... not
sold, leased or developed, 2 86 ANCSA did not provide that former reserva-
tion land could be acquired by Native corporation subject to federal re-
straints on alienation. The Court considered the fact that ANCSA did not
provide that former reservation land acquired by a Native corporation
would be subject to restraints on alienation as an indication that Congress
did not intend to use its power to preserve Native communities intact. The
Court stated that:
ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, state-chartered Native
corporations, without any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions,
and with the goal of avoiding "any permanent racially defined institutions,
rights, privileges, or obligations." By ANCSA's very design, Native corpora-
tions can immediately convey former reservation lands to non-Natives, and
such corporations are not restricted to using those lands for Indian purposes.
Because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Vene-
tie Reservation, and because the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian purposes,
we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement is not met.
287
Thus, while federal policy now supports Native American landowner-
ship, the federal judiciary has not fully supported the modem policy.288 The
courts over the past three decades increasingly conflate Native American
sovereignty and Native American property rights, two concepts that are
analytically distinct and are treated as such in non-Native American con-
texts.289 In 1989, for example, the Supreme Court held that tribal govern-
ments may not exercise zoning authority over certain fee land located
within a reservation but owned by nontribal members.290
The demographic makeup of a Native American reservation can de-
termine not only the extent of a tribe's sovereign powers, but in some in-
285 Native Viii. of Venetie, 522 U.S. at 524.
286 Id. at 533.
287 Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
288 Royster, supra note 226, at 20.
289 Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on
Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOc'V REV. 1123, 1126-27 (1994); Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty
and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991). The judiciary has also limited tribal sovereignty in cases
in which a tribe has attempted to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians. Singer, supra, at 24; see also
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (holding that, within Indian country, Indian tribes
are more than "private, voluntary organizations").
290 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 421-23
(1989).
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stances, the very physical boundaries of a reservation. In a series of cases
involving allotment-era statutes, federal courts have decided whether Con-
gress intended to diminish or terminate a reservation by passing surplus
land Acts that opened reservations to non-Native American settlers. The
legal question raised in diminishment cases "constitutes a uniquely histori-
cal issue"29' given that the drafters of the surplus land Acts assumed that
Native Americans would assimilate into society within a generation after the
reservations were opened and did not foresee that the reservations would con-
tinue to exist as a result of the New Deal Indian Reorganization Act.292 Even
so, courts have gone through the exercise of "determining" congressional in-
tent by fine parsing of language used in different surplus land acts.
Aware that an effort to deduce Congress's intent to diminish or pre-
serve a reservation based on the contemporaneous record is a largely for-
malistic exercise untethered from reality, federal courts in the past twenty-
five years have examined the subsequent "jurisdictional history,"2 93 includ-
ing the demographic composition of the opened lands.294 At root, the focus
in the cases on the demographic makeup of a community reflects the judici-
ary's anxiousness to protect the non-Native American's "justifiable
expectations" that they should not fall under the jurisdiction of tribal
government. 295  Where Native Americans remain a significant part of the
population in the opened part of a reservation, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered this to be a significant fact in holding that a reservation remained in-
tact.296  In cases where a majority of the population on the opened land
consists of non-Native Americans, courts have determined that the reserva-297
tion has been either diminished or terminated. If sovereignty remains the
key to Native American economic development, and courts are increasingly
limiting tribal sovereignty and even territory to land owned in fee either by
the tribe or its members, landownership is vital.298
291 Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 269, at 132.
292 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,468 (1984).
293 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584,604 (1977).
294 Solem, 465 U.S. at 471-72; Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387
(10th Cir. 1990).
295 Royster, supra note 226, at 7 1.
296 See, e-g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 463.
297 See, eg., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 604-05; DaCoteau v.
Dist. County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Yazzie, 909 F.2d at 1387. This focus upon the Indian ownership
of land as a key factor in determining the limits of a reservation hearkens back to the pre-1948, judi-
cially determined definition of Indian country. See Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 164-
65 (1920); see also Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 206 (1877).
298 Cf Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Pathways from Poverty: Economic Development & Insti-
tution Building on American Indian Reservations, 14 AI. INWDIAN CULTURE & REs. 89, 119 (1990) (argu-
ing that widespread economic development on Native American reservations has become more of a
possibility in recent years as decision making and businesses have shifted from outside of Indian Nations to
the Indian Nations themselves because "efficiency follows sovereignty"). Cornell and Kalt emphasize that
increased levels ofself-determination only make economic development more of a possibility. Id. In order
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B. In Takings Jurisprudence, Judges Do Not Consider the Importance
Land May Have for Minority Communities
In Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, courts have not balanced
the public purpose a governmental entity offers in its bid to condemn prop-
erty by eminent domain against the importance that the property holds for
rooted communities, whether minority or majority.299 In 1954, the Supreme
Court held that a state's eminent domain power was coterminous with the
state's police powers.300 Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, the Court held that the exercise of eminent domain power need
only be rationally related to achieving a public purpose, and the means cho-
sen to effect the articulated public purpose be merely rational.0 2 Together,
Berman and Midkiff vest state and federal authorities with almost unlimited
power to condemn property provided that the government pays just com-
pensation, no matter whether the property could be characterized as fungi-
ble or "property for personhood.3 03 Furthermore, in comparing the two
cases, in the later case of Midkiff, the Court focused less attention on the
public use rationale. In Berman, the Court made a nominal effort to address
the manner in which the community as a whole may have benefited from
the taking,30 4 while in Midkiff the Court did not view a taking that would
transfer property from one private individual to another as inconsistent with
the public use requirement because "'[i]t is not essential that the entire
community, nor even any considerable portion ... directly enjoy or partici-
pate in any improvement"' for the taking to be considered for the public
use.305 Of course, the use of the eminent domain power by a governmental
entity does not always signify that land will be distributed away from the
poor to the more wealthy; in fact, the state intervention in Midkiffredistrib-
uted land in favor of those with fewer rights in land.
In takings jurisprudence, urban renewal and highway projects highlight
the lack of judicial attention to the value that land may have for minority
communities. The urban renewal programs were initiated first under the
for tribes to capitalize on this opportunity, each tribe must develop culturally appropriate internal political
systems and adopt economic systems that respond to the needs and capacities ofthe tribe. Id. at 109-17.
299 Radin, supra note 244, at 1005; see also 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROtIAN, NICtOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1997).
300 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
301 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
302 Id. at 241-42.
303 See generally Radin, supra note 244.
304 Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35 ("It was believed that the piecemeal approach, the removal of indi-
vidual structures that were offensive, would be only a palliative. The entire area needed redesigning so
that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but
also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers.").
305 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
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Housing Act of 1949,306 and several federal highway projects were under-
taken by the 1860s.3 07 Together, these projects displaced a tremendous
number of people throughout the country;308 perhaps unsurprisingly, most
of the poor who were displaced were African Americans.
30 9
A finding that an urban renewal or highway program will destroy or
severely damage a community, however, provides no legal basis for halting
such a program. In a 1967 case, Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. El-
lington, 3 10 the district court judge denied an application for a temporary in-
junction filed by a community group seeking to halt a highway program
that would adversely impact a mostly African American community in
Nashville, Tennessee, despite a finding that the community's concerns were
legitimate. As the court of appeals noted:
[T]he blocking of other streets will result in a heavy increase in traffic through
the campus of Fisk University and on the street between this university and
Meharry Medical College. A public park used predominantly by Negroes will
be destroyed. Many business establishments owned by Negroes will have to
be relocated or closed.
3 '
Relying in part on Bernzan, the Sixth Circuit held that the courts could
not halt the project because the "minimizing of hardships and adverse eco-
nomic effects is a problem addressing itself to engineers, not judges."
312
C. Residential Communities, Common Property, and Restraints
on Alienation
The body of statutory and common-law rules governing the different
forms of group ownership of real property are designed to advance specific
economic or social policies. Even in private law doctrine, by allocating
power between individuals and the group, policy makers make certain
tradeoffs between promoting liberty and equality. 13 As applied to some
forms of common law group ownership, specifically the tenancy in com-
mon, the liberty interests of individuals prevail as against the ownership
group; in other forms of common ownership such as the condominium, the
law enhances the rights of the group as a whole at the expense of the indi-
306 Housing Act of 1949, tit. 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-64 (1964). The 1949 Housing Act introduced the
program of urban renewal, the first governmental program that policymakers knew would lead to a ma-
jor displacement of significant numbers of people in cities implementing such a project. Chester W.
Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REv. 745, 747 n.8 (1971).
307 Hartman, supra note 306, at 754.
308 Id. at 804-05.
309 HERBERT J. GANS, THE FAILURE OF URBAN RENE\VAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY
537,539 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
310 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
311 Id. at 186.
312 Id. at 185.
313 Ellickson, supra note 208, at 1345.
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vidual. The laws that have developed to implement these latter policies
subject the use and disposition of the property to group control--whether
property owned in common by all the members of the group or property
that individual members of the group own in some measure individually,
but acquire subject to a group ownership scheme.314  Even when groups
have the power to curtail individual property rights of those within the
group scheme, the law ensures that these individuals have the right to exit
the group on reasonable terms.
From the initial development of common law rules prohibiting direct
restraints on the alienation of property held in fee simple to the gradual
loosening of such rules in certain instances, this has been an area of law
heavily determined by public policies. Initially, the rule against restraints
on alienation developed to promote primarily economic ends. As back-
ground, the establishment of the right to convey property as one of the es-
sential incidents of fee simple ownership can be traced to the British
Parliament's enactment of the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290."' The stat-
ute established the principle of the free alienation of possessory estates and
marked the beginning of the end of the feudal system. 16 In the shift from
feudalism to market economies, as the free alienation of land came to be
viewed as essential to fostering economic and commercial development,
English courts established common law rules prohibiting direct restraints on
alienation.317 Absolute restraints on the alienation of a fee simple interest,
whether labeled as a disabling, forfeiture, or promissory restraint under the
traditional classifications, came to be held void in all instances.
318
In addition to the predominant economic justification for the rule
against restraints on alienation, some courts and commentators suggest that
the rule serves a political purpose. Greater alienability of land serves a de-
314 As the technology of the law has developed ever more sophisticated legal forms of ownership to
respond to the needs of people who would like to live in residential communities of one sort or another,
it becomes more difficult to describe the precise manner in which individuals hold property under many
of these forms of ownership by merely using the categories "individual" or "common" ownership. I
have used the phrase "property subject to group control" to capture the notion that under these forms of
ownership, individuals typically agree to cede to the group some of the rights they would be entitled to
as individual property owners in order to further the group ownership scheme. I have borrowed the
phrase "the technology of the law" from my colleague here at Wisconsin, Heinz Klug. His phrase
helped flesh out my ideas on the different treatment that emerging forms of ownership have received
under the rule on restraints against alienation.
315 Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
316 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 34, at 152-53.
317 City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Seagate Con-
do. Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF PROP.
2129-33, 2379-80 (1944). However, the ascendancy of the principle of free alienation was somewhat
counterbalanced by common law rules that responded to the aristocracy's desire to transfer its
landholdings intact from one generation to another. See generally Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-
Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221,261-82 (1995).
318 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 4.1-4.3 (1983); see also CUNNING-
HAM ET AL., supra note 29, § 2.2, at 30-3 1.
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centralized market system that in theory promotes the values of democracy
by preventing concentration of land (and the wealth it represents) in a he-
reditary aristocracy.319 Subjecting wealth concentrated in the hands of dy-
nastic families to market pressures promotes democratic ends. Providing
for unrestricted rights of alienation under all circumstances, however, does
not always increase democratic participation, to the extent that such goals
are promoted by landownership. In fact, unfettered rights of alienation may
in some circumstances redistribute property away from people with fewer
resources to those with greater resources. To this end, Joseph Singer has
argued that:
Under some market conditions, alienability may actually concentrate owner-
ship in the hands of the wealthy since such corporations or individuals are able
to bid more for property and may be able to induce others to sell. Restraints
on alienation of low-income housing may serve, therefore, to ensure its con-
tinued availability to poor families.
3
The rule against restraints on alienation is policy-driven, and
"[c]ompeting policy considerations... have, almost from the inception of
the rule, caused exceptions to be carved out of it."321 According to one
court in a leading case, the development of the rules against restraints on
alienation "is not a mathematical science but takes shape at the direction of
social and economic forces in an ever changing society."32 As it pertains
to various forms of group ownership of real property, the economic policy
disfavoring restraints on alienation often collides with policies or practices
that support the social and economic interests of groups or political goals of
civic participation.
The value the law assigns to particular forms of group ownership can
be measured in part by the degree to which the law allows a particular
group to restrict the rights of individual members to alienate property inter-
ests. Depending upon the form of ownership, the lav accords groups greater
or lesser ability to restrict the individual member's power to alienate. In more
specialized cases, the law may provide one group with more authority than
another group to restrict the right of individual alienation, despite the fact that
both groups own property under the same form of ownership.
319 Burdick v. Burdick, 33 F. Supp. 921,928 (D.D.C. 1940) (stating that "[p]ermitting unreasonable
restraints on alienation are inconsistent with the principles of democracy. They are the concomitants of
an aristocracy. Such restraints are relics of a feudal society, are obsolete and are repugnant to our insti-
tutions and conditions.").
320 SINGER, supra note 42, at 550.
321 Seagate Condo. Ass'n, 330 So. 2d at 485.
322 Gale v. York Ctr. Cmty. Coop., Inc., 171 N.E.2d 30, 33 (IlL 1960); se also Mclnerney v. Slights,
No. Civ.A.1096-S, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47, at *19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1988) ("The rule against unreason-
able restraints on alienation is based solely on social policy, not on the rights ofthe party on w'ham the re-
straint is imposed.").
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Some groups come to own land through consensual agreements, such
as condominiums, while others come together through the operation of the
law, as in groups that acquire land under the rules of intestacy. Where
common ownership arises by intestacy, the law assigns the group a form of
ownership, the tenancy in common, that provides the group with few
mechanisms that promote the interests of the overall group and contribute to
stability. If the law makes it difficult for a group to change the form of
ownership under which it owns property from one that permits the group
little power to restrain individual members' rights of alienation to one that
is more "group friendly," the law effectively adjudges stability within the
particular community as unimportant. The same analysis applies to situa-
tions in which the law prevents a group that owns property under a form of
ownership that permits few restraints on alienation from establishing its
own set of rules regulating entry and exit into or from the group that di-
verge from the default rules under the particular form of ownership. Such
barriers to private ordering also promote unstable ownership.
The following discussion reveals that with respect to condominiums, co-
operatives, and similar forms of residential ownership, the law allows prop-
erty-owning groups to limit the alienation rights of individual owners in order
to promote "community." Judicial recognition of the overriding value of
community in this context contrasts starkly with the unbounded economic
values of individual wealth maximization that drive the common law rules
governing partition of tenancies in common in most circumstances.
In recent times, legislatures and judges have created liberal exceptions
to the rule against restraints on alienation "in connection with sales of resi-
dential property, particularly those involving condominium and cooperative
arrangements, and on the transfer of shares of corporate stock. 323 For these
forms of common ownership that were developed to meet the demand for
residential housing, courts give credence to the social and economic justifica-
tions offered by the group seeking to impose the restraints, typically on trans-
fers of ownership interests and use, even though the restraints may cause
economic harm to certain individuals. Although some courts engage in a rig-
orous analysis of the arguments offered in favor of the restraints, other courts
accept bare assertions that the challenged restraints serve a beneficial pur-
pose for the community of residential owners or society as a whole.
324
323 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, notes to Pt. 11, at 4 (1983).
324 As discussed infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text, recent opinions demonstrate that judges
accept rather bare-boned statements that certain restrictions on the transfer of an ownership interest or
on the use of the property owned in residential communities serve some socially beneficial purpose.
Such judicial solicitude for those groups seeking to impose these restrictions on transfer and use is simi-
lar to the relaxation of judicial standards for granting partition sales. In many partition cases, judges
now simply accept conclusory averments that the land at issue cannot be equitably divided. See
Casagrande, supra note 28, at 766. Of course the relaxation of the judicial standards in these two areas
serve contrasting policies.
556
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Some of the most important decisions limiting application of the rules
against restraints on alienation have been made in the context of coopera-
tive housing schemes. In a cooperative housing arrangement, the members
of the cooperative own stock in a nonprofit corporation, and such stock
ownership entitles each member to occupy an individual apartment.32 In
this type of cooperative housing structure, just as in a tenancy in common,
the members of the cooperative are financially interdependent. The Re-
statement on Property states that:
It is essential to the financial stability of such a corporation that the members
each contribute their share of the taxes, maintenance and mortgage expenses of
the premises, because the only source of corporate income is usually the as-
sessments levied on individual member-stockholders, and the entire premises,
including the interests of all the members of the corporation, are subject to
foreclosure sale in the event that the corporation defaults on its obligations.
326
Due to such financial interdependence, the corporate bylaws of such coopera-
fives normally require the board of directors or a majority of the members to




In the leading case of Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue,
Inc.,328 a New York state court considered the lawfulness of a restraint on
alienation that required tenant owners of a cooperative apartment to receive
approval from either the board of directors or from two-thirds of the stock-
holders prior to transferring stock ownership or assigning a lease. In a deci-
sion upholding the restraints, the court focused almost exclusively on the
needs of the group. The court considered "the residential nature of the en-
terprise, the privilege of selecting neighbors and the needs of the commu-
nity' ' 329 as important factors outweighing individual tenant desires for
unrestricted alienation rights. In holding that "the special nature of the
ownership of co-operative apartment houses by tenant owners requires that
they be not included in the general rule against restraint on the sale of stock
in corporations organized for profit,"330 the court determined that there was
a social value to promoting stable residential communities organized under
cooperative housing forms of ownership.
Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the
legality of a restraint on alienation in a suit against an association that de-
veloped and maintained a cooperative subdivision "as a carefully planned,
nonspeculative, attractive community., 331 The challenged restraint gave the
association one year to purchase the interest of a member wishing to with-
325 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFPROP.: DONATIVETRANSFERS § 4.1, at 171 (1983).
326 Id. at 171-72.
327 Id. at 172.
328 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939).
329 Id. at 422.
330 Id. at 423.
331 Gale, 171 N.E.2d at31.
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draw from the association either at an agreed-upon price or at a price set by
an appraiser. 32 In considering the restraint, the court established a broad
rule for determining the lawfulness of restraints on alienation that many
courts throughout the country have followed. The court held that:
[T]he crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared
with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted
social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably
necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained.
333
Because the court believed that the restraints included in the member-
ship agreements provided "the only way to keep [such] co-operative hous-
ing co-operative, ' 334 the court had to determine in the first instance whether
the residential community had a redeeming social value. Arguably, the
court should have protected the cooperative housing arrangement from the
unchecked forces of the market only if such residential communities serve
some useful purpose for the society. In deciding that the restraints were
reasonable, the court recognized that legal instruments designed to promote
stability within such communities serve important social ends, namely cre-
ating stable residential communities.
Just as courts have recognized the societal value of communities or-
ganized into cooperative housing developments, courts have determined
that condominium arrangements represent an increasingly important type of
residential living.335 Though individual members of a condominium are not
as financially interdependent as members of many housing cooperatives,
courts have determined that the same kinds of restraints on transfer and use
are lawful when included in condominium agreements. In addressing the
nature of condominium living, a Florida appellate court wrote in a much-
cited opinion:
[I]nherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote the
health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners since
they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each
unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might
otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.
336
Instead of focusing on the financial sustainability of such communities,
many courts consider whether the restraints serve a state's public policy
goals or, more narrowly, contribute to promoting the "community life" of
the condominium community.
332 Id. at 32. The association's membership agreement also placed certain restraints on the ability of
those acquiring a membership interest under either a will or the laws of intestacy to become members of
the association. Id.
333 Id. at 33.
331 Id. at 32.
335 Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
336 Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
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In 1989, in a case involving a publicly subsidized condominium devel-
opment, a California court of appeals upheld restrictive covenants designed
to ensure affordable housing for persons of low- and moderate-income and
to promote a stable community of owner-occupiers. 337 In this case, private
developers purchased the land from the City of Oceanside in order to con-
struct replacement dwellings for low- and moderate-income people who
were displaced because of an urban renewal project. These developers
placed covenants, conditions, and restrictions on the community that re-
quired condominium owners to occupy their units as their principal place of
residence and prevented such owners from renting or leasing their units.3
The restrictions were to be maintained for ten years after completion of the
construction of the condominiums.
In upholding these restrictions, the appellate court first determined that,
when judging the lawfulness of the restraint, "the court must balance the
justification for the restriction against the quantum of the restraint" with
more restrictive conditions requiring stronger justifications.339 To this end,
the court viewed the restraints as consistent with the public policy of Cali-
fornia to promote affordable housing for all families within the state. The
court maintained that the restraints on alienation promoted the state policy
because they directly "related to the stated purposes of maintaining a stabi-
lized community of low and moderate income residents and discouraging
speculation by real estate investors. 340
Although the California appellate court considered whether the re-
straints on alienation in McKenna served public policy ends, other courts
have merely considered the needs of the community of condominium own-
ers. For example, a Florida appellate court upheld the lawfulness of restric-
tive conditions contained in a condominium declaration that, as in
McKenna, forbade unit owners from signing long-term leases on their
units. 341 Although the case did not involve affordable housing or any other
noteworthy public policy, the court upheld the leasing restrictions because it
viewed the goal of protecting the very character of the condominium com-
munity as reasonable. The court stated that:
Given the unique problems of condominium living in general and the special
problems endemic to a tourist oriented community in South Florida in particu-
lar, appellant's avowed objective--to inhibit transciency [sic] and to impart a
certain degree of continuity of residence and a residential character to their
337 City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. CL App. 1989). The individual grant
deeds stated that the restrictions were designed "to achieve a stabilized community of owner-occupied
dwelling units, to avoid artificial inflation ofprices caused by resales by speculators and to prevent scar-
city caused by vacant homes awaiting resale by speculators." Id. at 278.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 279.
340 Id.
341 Seagate Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484,485 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1976).
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community-is, we believe, a reasonable one .... The attainment of this
community goal outweighs the social value of retaining for the individual unit
owner the absolutely unqualified right to dispose of his property in any way
and for such duration or purpose as he alone so desires.
342
In some instances, courts seek to preserve the character of a particular
community by upholding restraints that limit the class of people who may
purchase property in planned residential developments from owners who
would like to sell their property. For example, the Florida court of appeals
recently upheld restraints on alienation that sought to preserve the character
of a planned development for military officers.3 3 The Indian River Colony
Club restricted prospective purchasers to members of its Club-a club re-
stricted to people who had served in the military as commissioned or chief
warrant officers. In addition, the property deeds contained a provision that
mandated thepurchase price a property owner would be entitled to receive
upon resale.
344
The court noted that holding the restriction limiting resales to club
members to be unreasonable would destroy the primary purpose of the
planned development, which was to serve a particular community of mili-
tary officers. With respect to the restriction on the resale prices owners
could receive, however, the court merely parroted the language from the
deed of restrictions, which stated that the restrictions were made "for the
mutual and reciprocal benefit of each and every residential lot and apart-
ment in the subdivision."
345
In sum, judges and legislators have found that relaxing the rules
against restraints on alienation can serve a useful purpose in promoting sta-
ble communities. State courts throughout the country have upheld restraints
imposed upon owners who live in residential developments under the ra-
tionale of preserving and promoting stable communities. As discussed ear-
lier in subpart IV.A, Congress has placed restraints on alienation of land
owned by Native Americans, thereby facilitating the ability of Native
Americans to preserve their cultures and ways of life. Since passage of the
Indian Reorganization Act, the restrictions on alienation of Native Ameri-
can-owned trust land have played a useful role in stemming land loss in the
Native American community.
Therefore, it is clear that the technology of the law can easily develop
new legal rules or forms of group ownership that restrict individual alien-
ation in order to promote the ability of groups of owners to maintain stable
landownership and healthy communities. Such rules have not been devel-
oped thus far to address the heir property problem that has lead to dramatic
land loss among African Americans. However, the demonstrated link be-
342 Id. at 486-87.
343 Indian River Colony Club, Inc. v. Bagg, 727 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
344 Id. at 1144.
345 Id. at 1146.
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tween landownership, democratic participation, and community building for
African Americans in this country provides compelling evidence that black
landowners of property owned in common deserve as much legal protection
as Native American landowners or even condominium owners. The final
Part of this Article provides a roadmap for those decision makers who might
be compelled by the moral obligation to help African American landowners
maintain their land and other African Americans to acquire or reacquire land.
V. PROPOSAL
In the past thirty years, the decline in rural black landholdings has been
called a "crisis" and black farmers have been referred to as an "endangered
species" in reports that exhibit an ever-increasing tone of desperation.
However one chooses to describe the phenomenon, the number of black
farmers and the number of rural acres under black ownership currently stand
at the lowest point since 1900. If the losses are not reversed or at least halted,
African Americans will be effectively shut out of the agricultural sector as
producers and rural black people will soon own less land than rural black
people owned in the years immediately following the Civil War. Addressing
the issue of land loss by itself, however, will not do much to improve the
standing of black farmers and rural landowners. At present, many rural Af-
rican Americans cannot productively use land they own. As the Pigford
lawsuit made plain, many black farmers have been denied credit unlawfully.
In other instances, African Americans who hold an interest in their prop-
erty-no matter how large-are unable to use the land as collateral to se-
cure financing to build homes or to improve their agricultural operations.3
6
Just as the USDA and its county agents systematically discriminated
against black farmers for decades, driving many of these farmers out of busi-
ness, meaningful policy reform must be just as systematic and far-reaching.3
7
Simply allowing the members of the Pigford class to collect limited damages
will do next to nothing to ensure that black people will have the opportunity
to participate as producers in the agricultural sector of the economy during
the next century. The moral imperative to redress fundamental acts of injus-
tice applies with equal force to those thousands of rural black landowners
who lost their land due to the unethical, sometimes illegal, practices of white
346 Graber, supra note 60, at 278 ("Those who describe the 'equity base' that blacks have in South-
em farmland refuse to recognize that much of this equity base cannot generate credit. This land %,ill not
finance a home or farm equipment or serve as collateral for an emergency loan.").
347 The need for far-reaching policy reform also applies to the problem of heir property for Ameri-
can Indians who hold fractionated interests in allotted land. Sce Carl G. Hakansson, Allotment at Pine
Ridge Reservation: Its Consequences andAlternatire Renicdies, 73 N.D. L REv 231,256 (1997) ("It is
difficult to envision a policy as radical as assimilation and allotment being implemented presently in the
United States. It may, however, take the implementation of a policy more radical than Congress has
thus far been willing to consider to effectively address the problems at hand.); see also Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987) (stating that the "fractionation problem on Indian reservations is extraordinary
and may call for dramatic action to encourage consolidation").
95:505 (2001)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
attorneys and land speculators who have used the rules governing partition
actions as a lever to force the sale of black-owned land.
Policymakers must take an organic approach to restoring meaningful
ownership to rural African Americans. Such an approach requires at least
the three following elements: land consolidation, land restoration, and
community legal education. Furthermore, both the state and federal gov-
ernment must develop policies directed at these three ends. In addition to
these three core measures, federal and state officials should assist African
American landowners who own land of special historical significance to
place such land in trust. Protection of such African American land not only
will help the current owners and their descendants maintain ownership of
such land, but also will provide future generations of African Americans
with an opportunity to keep alive-and learn firsthand about-an important
part of their heritage.
Land consolidation initiatives could help improve the security of tenure
of present heir property holders. At a bare minimum, the law should enable
groups of African Americans who hold heir property to reorganize their
ownership of the land under rules that would not require unanimous consent
of all interest holders. If either a majority or super-majority of the interests
in a tenancy in common are permitted to change the default rules governing
their tenancy in common or to convert to another form of ownership alto-
gether, land can be managed more effectively to the benefit of the majority.
Under such modified rules, the group could lawfully place restrictions
on alienation of individual interests similar to those approved of for condo-
miniums and cooperatives. These relatively newer forms of residential
ownership, together with their restrictions on alienation, are well-
established in law because they respond to the market demand for commu-
nity-oriented group living. Likewise, the law should affirmatively recog-
nize that the continued black ownership of rural lands serves a higher
purpose-it promotes a more democratic union.
In addition to helping African American landowners as a group stabi-
lize their common property holdings, the federal government should restore
land to black farmers who lost their land due to foreclosure by the USDA.
The settlement of the Pigford class action lawsuit only provides for limited
land restoration, even in those cases in which the USDA played a signifi-
cant role in driving successful black farmers into bankruptcy. Broader land
restoration would be consistent with the recent efforts made by countries
such as South Africa to return land to individuals and communities who lost
their land due to unjust governmental actions in a prior period in the coun-
try's history.
Even if land were restored to African Americans or tenants in common
of heir property were given the right to reorganize their landownership un-
der a more stable form, poor landowners would often lack access to lawyers
who can help them manage their land effectively or fend off speculators
who seek to acquire ownership of their land. To remedy this, Congress
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should expand the mission of legal services to allow poor landowners ac-
cess to legal services lawyers. Such an expanded vision of legal services
would recognize that there is as much value in preventing those on the cusp
of distress from falling into the ranks of the economically disenfranchised
as there is in trying to help those already destitute survive on the margins.
The following discussion develops each of the proposed policy reforms
in detail. However, given the complexity of the heir property problem, it
should be emphasized that any approach that seeks to implement only one
or two of these proposals will likely provide only temporary relief.
A. Land Consolidation
In many parts of the world, rural land has fallen into unproductive use.
This often occurs after the ownership becomes physically fragmented or
when the number of people or entities who hold a legal interest in the land
grows beyond a certain critical point.348  Such fragmentation of land or
ownership or both often arises due to "the application of rigid inheritance
rules. '349 Clearly, the heir property phenomenon in rural, African American
communities and among Native Americans is a paradigmatic example of
fractionation caused, in part, by inheritance law.
In an effort to return such land to productive use, a number of countries
have enacted land consolidation legislation. 350 Under classic land consoli-
dation, legislatures seek to aggregate spatially fragmented landholdings into
as few newly consolidated holdings as possible.3 In addition, in Norway,
the law also enables those charged with consolidating the land to attempt to
improve the landownership pattern by introducing rules designed to im-
prove cooperation between those stakeholders with an interest in the land.352
In all state-sponsored consolidation efforts-as in legislatively approved
condominium schemes--those enacting or implementing land consolidation
348 Although land fragmentation is typically considered from the standpoint ofspatial patterns, "le-
gal" fragmentation occurs once the number of people or entities holding overlapping--and often con-
flicting-egal interests in a parcel of land exceeds the point at which these different people or entities
can effectively manage and utilize the land productively. Cf Heller, supra note 44, at 624 (discumg
problem in which an initial distribution of property rights gives too many owners a right to exclude oth-
ers from using the scarce resource and claiming that "when there are too many owners holding rights of
exclusion, the resource is prone to underse-a tragedy of the anticommons.").
349 PEDRO MORAL-LOPEZ & ERICH H. JACOBY, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., PRINCIPLES OF
LAND CONSOLIDATION LEGISLATION 115 (1962).
350 See, e.g., Torgeir Austenk, Agrarian Land Law in Norway. in AGRARIAN LAND LAW IN THE
WESTERN WORLD 134, 138-40 (Margaret Rosso Grossman & Wim Bmssard eds., 1992); Otto Schiller,
Aspects of Land Consolidation in Germany, in LAND TENuRE (Kenneth H. Parsons et al. eds., 1956);
Philip Oldenburg, Land Consolidation as Land Reform, in India, 18 WORLD DEv. 183 (1990); Jian-
Ming Zhou, Land Consolidation in Japan and Other Rice-Based Economies Under Private Landowner-
ship in Monsoon Asia, LAND REFORM, 199811, at 123 (primarily proposing changes to Japan's land con-
solidation initiatives).
351 Oldenburg, supra note 350, at 183.
352 Austent. supra note 350, at 138-40.
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initiatives must balance the interests of the individual, the landowners as a
group, and the society. 3  Even so, a fundamental principle underlying con-
solidation is that no individual should suffer economic loss in the consolida-
tion process.
354
In the United States, almost all proposals offered to cure the problems
of fractionated, Native American heir property and in the landholdings of
rural blacks assume that the tenancy in common form must be maintained.
Much like "classic land consolidation" measures, these proposals seek to
reduce the levels of fractionation by aggregating the interests in particular
parcels of heir property in an effort to reduce the number of people who re-
tain legal interests in the property. This may be done by intestacy reform, 355
modification of partition laws, 356 and changes in adverse possession laws.
357
To address African American heir property problems, some proposed
changes to the partition and adverse possession laws would require the real-
location of many rights in the tenancy in common to the tenants in posses-
sion and a significant reduction of the rights of the tenants not in
possession. For example, C. Scott Graber has proposed that cotenants in
possession be given the right to constructively oust other cotenants after
twenty years with the exception of "those who derived their interest by de-
vise or inheritance from the same source as the claiming co-tenant."
358
Graber also proposes that cotenants in possession be given the right to force
a sale of the interests held by unknown heirs.359  Similarly, Harold A.
353 Cf Hans Sevatdal, Land Consolidation in Norway, 1-2 (1968) (unpublished paper delivered at
the Conference on Subdivision, Redesign and Neighborhood Pooling, Fort Myers, Florida (1986)) (on
file with author). Particular national policies and the needs of the national economy provide the basic
framework for government officials vested with authority to consolidate private landholdings. See Aus-
tenA, supra note 350 at 138-40.
354 Oldenburg, supra note 350, at 183. Put differently, Oldenburg states that "while land consolida-
tion programs reallocate land, they require the preservation of the distribution of wealth in land." Id. at
14; cf. Hugo A. Pearce, III, Note, "Heirs' Property": The Problem, Pitfalls and Possible Solutions, 25
S.C. L. REv. 151, 157-58 (1973).
355 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 92, at 726-27 (1971) (highlighting some of the intestacy reform
proposals offered to solve the problem of heir property for Native Americans).
356 See, e.g., Chris Kelley, Stemming the Loss of Black ained Farmland Through Partition Ac-
tion-A Partial Solution, 1985 ARK. L. NOTES 35. Kelley proposes that, in partition actions in Arkan-
sas, those tenants in common who do not wish to sell their interests should be given the right to purchase
the interests of those who indicate a willingness to sell their interests in the property for its appraised
value at a private sale. Id. at 40. Further, Kelley proposes that only tenants who own a simple majority
of the interests in a tenancy in common should be permitted to seek a judicial sale of the property. Id.;
see also Harold A. McDougall, Black Landowners Beware: A Proposal for Statutory Reform, 9 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 135-36 (1980). McDougall proposes that, in certain circumstances, heirs
be given the right to buy out their fellow cotenants' interests prior to the filing of a partition action and
absent the consent of the other cotenants. One such circumstance he identifies would be when more
than two-thirds of the heirs petition for such a forced private sale. Id. at 136.
357 See, e.g., Graber, supra note 60, at 282; see also McDougall, supra note 356, at 136.
358 See Graber, supra note 60, at 282-84.
359 Id.
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McDougall proposes, inter alia, that heirs who have been in possession for
a long time be given the right to purchase the property at a private sale once
a partition act is initiated. The proceeds of the sale would then be held in
escrow for the other heirs and any unclaimed portion eventually would be
refunded to the purchasing heir.3  He also proposes that the adverse pos-
session laws be changed to make it easier for a tenant in possession to pos-
sess the property adversely against absentee heirs.361  As part of his
proposal to make it easier for a tenant in possession to constructively oust a
tenant not in possession, McDougall would permit tenants in possession to
tack the occupancy of their immediate predecessors in title in order to re-
duce the amount of time it would take to satisfy the statutory adverse pos-
session period.362
Providing "in" tenants with greater rights at the expense of "out" tenants
would benefit rural African Americans who want to continue farming agricul-
tural land. Such proposals are, however, problematic for a number of rea-
sons. First, an overarching problem for many of these proposals is the lack of
individual fairness afforded to certain cotenants. Requiring individuals with
vested property rights to suffer economic loss in the process of consolidation
should be avoided if there are fairer alternatives. Such proposals, moreover,
violate a central tenet of international land consolidation-individuals should
not suffer economic loss in the process of consolidation.
Second, these proposals do not provide a long-term remedy.363 For ex-
ample, under the constructive ouster proposal, the problems of fractionation
will recur if the tenant in possession dies intestate. Given the overall rate of
will making for both rural African Americans landowners and other poor
rural Americans, this recurrence is more likely than not. In addition, vest-
ing a tenant in possession with the right to force a sale of the property as-
sumes that this tenant may be well-positioned to maintain the property. To
the extent that much of heir property has been underutilized, however, there
may be instances in which a poor tenant in possession has elected to remain
in possession in order to live rent-free in a dwelling on the family property.
If this person receives the power to force a sale of the property, she could be
susceptible to land speculators who might agree to finance the sale provided
that the land is transferred immediately thereafter. Even if this tenant in
possession could acquire the property for herself, she may ultimately lose
the property through foreclosure, tax sale, or distress sale unless her finan-
cial status significantly improves.
Intestacy reform proposals that seek to reduce the further fractionation
of heir property may be unfair to the extent that certain individuals in the
360 See McDougall, supra note 356, at 135-36.
361 Id. at 136.
362 Id.; see also Graber, supra note 60, at 282.
363 See MORAL-L6PEz, supra note 349, at 119 (stating that preventing "future excessive subdivision
and fragmentation is as important as the consolidation of fragmented holdings").
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ownership group will have more restricted options for passing on their
property than others. Even absent such fairness concerns, intestacy reform
alone offers too mild of an approach to address a problem of the magnitude
of heir property. For example, proposals to restrict the class of people eli-
gible to inherit under a will or to restrict the class that takes under the rules
of intestacy will not consolidate the number of tenants in common in a
timely or effective manner.3 64 In those instances in which land has become
highly fractionated with large numbers of people holding an interest in the
tenancy in common, changes in the laws of inheritance, no matter how far-
reaching, would not consolidate the number of interests in any reasonable
period of time. The most aggressive intestacy reform proposals would al-
low just one person to inherit a piece of land. However, resurrecting the
law of primogeniture, or some gender-neutral variation, faces the likely po-
litical opposition of the heirs who would lose the right to take under the
laws of descent. 365 Primogeniture was rejected in America from the Found-
ing as a vestige of feudalism. Given this history, the general public will not
likely support primogeniture as a reform measure-even a modem version
designed to promote democratic interests antithetical to feudalism.
3 66
Existing proposals to ameliorate the heir property problem assume the
tenancy in common as a starting point. Such proposals would improve the
status quo by paring down the number of people with an interest in a given
heir property tract. Some of the worst symptoms of the heir property prob-
lem are addressed by this strategy, including the inability of cotenants who
would like to manage land productively to do so given the ownership inter-
est of so many remote, passive holders and the increased risk of partition
action when a tenant acquires an interest in the common property from a
remote heir. The resulting tenancy in common still would be unstable,
however, as any one tenant could seek a partition sale no matter how small
her interest. In addition, these proposals do not help those who remain in
the tenancy to better manage their common property.
A better approach is to restructure the tenancy in common along the
lines of newer forms of ownership such as condominiums and cooperatives
364 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 92, at 741. In discussing the fractionated heir property that nega-
tively impacts Native Americans, Williams argues that "[e]ven if only one heir is allowed to inherit and
wills are not permitted unless there is only one devisee, land within multitudes of interests will not be
returned to manageable status within a tolerable period of time." Id.
365 See Lawson, supra note 87, at 60. Lawson states the following: "[A]ny attempt to resolve the is-
sue by limiting the number of persons entitled to inherit would be resisted by prospective heirs. Even
though the value of their interests may be paltry, forced disinheritance would only create resentment
and, ideally, should therefore be avoided." Id. at 95. This observation obviously proved to be prescient
in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) and Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U.S. 234 (1997).
366 On an international level, one commentator has noted that in many countries it is very difficult to
change inheritance laws in order to consolidate or prevent fragmentation of rural land holdings because
inheritance law "often derives from ancient social and religious custom." MORAL-L6PEZ, supra note
349, at 103.
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or the limited liability company (LLC). These have advantages over both
tenancies in common and the general partnership form. Allowing those in
tenancies to restructure their relationships better balances the goals of
strengthening the rights of the common ownership group and protecting the
rights of individuals within the group.
A real focus of effective policy reform must be the default rules gov-
erning relations among tenants in common by operation of law, that is, not
voluntary and consensual communities. Unlike tenancies in common
formed by voluntary agreement, members of nonconsensual tenancies in
common lack direct control over the formation of the tenancy in common or
the composition of the initial members of the ownership group. 67 Given
such uncertainty, in almost all instances the prospective "co-tenants by law"
cannot preplan their relationship by entering into an agreement that allo-
cates the rights and responsibilities of members prior to the moment that the
law declares them to be tenants in common. 368 Therefore, the moment the
tenancy in common is formed by operation of law, the tenancy in common
is most likely to be subject to the default rules.369 Theoretically, the mem-
bers of a nonconsensual tenancy in common can develop a new set of rules
allocating the rights and duties of each cotenant that would supercede the
default rules. However, negotiating after-the-fact agreements is practically
impossible for "co-tenants by law" because the law requires each of the co-
tenants to enter into the agreement. 370 Not only must the cotenants by law
overcome significant transaction costs in some instances, but also those in-
dividual cotenants who believe that the default rules benefit them have little
incentive to negotiate away such an advantage without receiving major con-
cessions from their fellow cotenants.
37 1
These obstacles to private ordering become nearly impossible barriers
as the number of cotenants grows. Transaction costs may prevent even
those holding nearly all the interests in any given heir property parcel to re-
structure their ownership arrangement by private management. This sug-
gests that government intervention is required to overcome the
intransigence of individual "holdouts."
The goal should be to allow majorities to act without unanimity; at the
same time, individual interests should be protected through measures that
permit exit from the group as well as fair value for the individual's interest.
What follows are two proposals that could be pursued either independently
or as a package. One would require states to spend little, if any, money.
The other, more comprehensive, proposal would require states to establish
367 Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The INs and OUTs of Cotenant Possession
Value Liability and a Callfor Default Rule Reforn, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331.390.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 390-91.
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land consolidation courts that would require short-term expenditures, but
would be likely to produce more economically productive landholdings that
would benefit the wider economy.
1. Allow Either a Majority or Super Majority of Those Holding Com-
mon Tenancy Interests to Restructure the Tenancy as a Limited Liability
Company. Those who own an interest in heir property are often locked into
an ownership structure that denies them the normal benefits of a fee simple
interest. And heir property exacerbates some of the structural problems of the
tenancy in common. The LLC, described below, provides more stability, bet-
ter mechanisms to allocate management responsibility and reasonable exit
options as compared to the tenancy in common.
The LLC was developed for the management of unincorporated busi-
ness organizations. Unhappy with the general partnership's rules concern-
ing vicarious liability,3  interest groups representing those in the
accounting and legal professions helped to develop and introduce the LLC
in the 1980s. 373 Members in LLCs are subject only to limited liability re-
gardless of how active a role they play in management, but are taxed as
partnerships. 374 These features have provided businesses organized as gen-
eral partnerships with incentives to convert their form of ownership; so
many general partnerships have converted that some commentators have pro-
nounced the general partnership a dead business form.375 The LLC form is
also more responsive to the interests of the ownership group in maintaining
continuity of the business upon the withdrawal of individual members than
the general partnership. A brief comparison of the laws governing general
partnerships and the Delaware LLC statute-chosen because of Delaware's
historic role in shaping the law of business organizations-is instructive.
A general partnership in many ways resembles a tenancy in common.
Many of the default and immutable rules governing general partnerships
work best for small firms with limited numbers of partners who know and
trust one another.376 Analogous to each cotenant's equal rights to posses-
sion of the whole property, a general partnership consists of partners with
372 Members in an LLC face far less exposure to liability based upon the actions of their associates
than do partners in a general partnership who are each subject to vicarious liability for the actions of
their fellow partners.
373 See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 68 (2d ed. 1999).
374 Cf LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 286 (1996). By 1996, all 50
states and the District of Columbia had enacted LLC statutes. Id.
375 See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 373, at 70. Not only are partners in a general partner-
ship able to limit their liability if the partnership converts to an LLC, but LLC statutes typically mini-
mize the conversion costs that other entities must bear to convert their entities into LLCs. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-214 (1998).
376 See 0KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 373, at 62.
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equal rights to the management and profits of the enterprise. 37 As in a ten-
ancy in common, conflicts may arise between the partners in a partnership
if the individual owners contribute substantially different amounts of
money, service, or time to the business. 378 Furthermore, the rules governing
the exit of individual partners from a partnership are almost identical to the
common-law rules governing partition actions. The filing of a partition ac-
tion by an individual tenant in common usually results in a judicial sale of
the property. In most cases, "any partner can withdraw from the partnership
at will, force a judicial liquidating sale, and receive the net value of her
partnership interest in cash. ' 379 Although the ability of any individual part-
ner to force a liquidation of a general partnership makes a general partner-
ship an unstable business form, a general partnership is more stable than a
tenancy in common because partnership default rules prevent partners from
transferring their full partnership interests to third parties without the
unanimous consent of the other partners.
380
In comparison, LLC statutes allocate more control to the ownership
group than to individual members. At the same time, these statutes protect
the economic interests of individual members. Examining certain provi-
sions of the Delaware LLC statute demonstrates the degree to which at least
one state legislature sought to reallocate power within unincorporated busi-
ness enterprises. Like a corporation, LLCs in Delaware are deemed to have a
perpetual existence unless an operating agreement specifies otherwise.38 l
Such continuity of life is normally unaffected by an individual member's
withdrawal from the entity.382 In order to dissolve an LLC, members holding
two-thirds of the interests must consent to the dissolution unless the operat-
ing agreement provides otherwise.383 Although the LLC normally contin-
377 See id at 63.
378 See id.
379 Id. at 129.
380 LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 10D (4th
ed. 1997). However, partners may freely assign their financial rights to third parties, including their
rights to their share of the profits and losses and their right to receive distributions. Id. at 96.
381 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(1) (1998).
382 Tit. 6, § 18-801(b). This section provides:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement the death, retirement,
expulsion, bankruptcy or dissolution of any member or the occurrence of any other event that ter-
minates the continued membership ofany member shall not cause the limited liability company to
be dissolved or its affairs to be wound up, and upon the occurrence ofny such event, the limited
liability company shall be continued without dissolution.
Id.
383 Tit. 6, § 18-801(a)(3). This section of the statute provides that an LLC may be dissolved in the
following way:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, upon the affirmative vote
or written consent of the members ofthe limited liability company or, ifthere is more than I class or
group of members, then by each class or group of members, in either case, by members who own
more than two-thirds of the then-current percentage or other interest in the profits ofthe limited liabil-
ity company owned by all of the members or by the members in each class or group, as appropriate.
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ues after a member resigns for any reason, the resigning member is entitled
to receive fair value for her interest as of the date the membership ceased.384
The LLC also has the unilateral right to acquire the interest of any member
provided that fair value is paid.385 Like a general partnership, members may
only assign their financial interest, but not their right to manage the LLC.386
Just as a member may seek a partition sale of property owned under a
tenancy in common, an LLC may be dissolved upon application of a mem-
ber or manager if the court determines that "it is not reasonably practicable
to carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability company
agreement." 387 Although the specific judicial dissolution provision of the
Delaware LLC statute may appear to allocate a great amount of power to an
individual member seeking liquidation, the overall scheme of the Delaware
LLC statute makes it clear that court-ordered dissolution should be ordered
only in unusual circumstances. As indicated above, LLCs are deemed to
have perpetual existence and the default statutory rules require two-thirds of
the members to consent to a dissolution in cases in which a court-ordered
dissolution is not sought.
Mechanisms for allocation of management responsibilities within an
LLC provide flexibility. Absent a different agreement, decisions are made
by those holding more than fifty percent of the interests in the profits of the
company.388 However, the members of an LLC in Delaware may agree to
vest complete or partial management of the entity in a manager or manag-
ers389 and may establish different classes or groups of members with differ-
ent voting rights.
390
Interestingly, the Delaware statute includes several provisions that fa-
cilitate the ability of businesses organized under other forms of ownership
to convert their ownership to LLC form (and, for that matter, for LLCs to
convert to other forms of ownership). Other enumerated entities391 may
convert to an LLC by filing a certificate of conversion 392 and a certificate of393
formation as an LLC. Prior to converting, however, these other entities
must comply with the rules that govern the preexisting ownership arrange-
Id.
384 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-604 (1998).
385 Tit. 6, § 18-702(e).
386 Tit. 6, § 18-702(a)-(b).
387 Tit. 6, § 18-802.
388 Tit. 6, § 18-402.
389 Id.
390 Tit. 6, § 18-302.
391 Tit. 6, § 18-214(a). These entities include "a business trust or association, a real estate invest-
ment trust, a common-law trust or any other unincorporated business, including a partnership (whether
general (including a registered limited liability partnership) or limited (including a registered limited li-
ability limited partnership)) or a foreign limited liability company." Id.
392 Tit. 6, § 18-214(b)(1).
393 Tit. 6, § 18-214(b)(2).
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ment, including rules that determine what proportion of members must
agree to the proposed conversion to another form of ownership. 394 Both
certificates are simple in form, requiring limited information such as the
names of the entities. In addition, LLCs may convert to other forms of
ownership or may merge or consolidate with other entities provided that
more than fifty percent of those holding an interest in the profits of the
company agree, unless the LLC agreement provides otherwise."9
Limited liability statutes, such as the one in Delaware, aim to minimize
the transaction costs of converting ownership form, and thus promote the
ability of those who own equity jointly to adapt to changed circumstances.
Those businesses not organized as LLCs may convert their ownership form
to an LLC; LLCs may be easily converted to other forms of ownership.
Present state law should be changed to permit those holding a majority or
super-majority of common tenancy interests to convert to an LLC and to es-
tablish the basic framework of the operating agreement. However, such op-
erating agreements should not permit those vested with management
authority to acquire an interest of an individual member without the consent
of such member. In addition, homestead protections could be provided for
that would ensure that those living in a dwelling on property primarily suited
for economic uses retain the right to possession of such dwelling.396 Though
individuals would lose the right simply to liquidate the ownership at will (by
filing for a partition sale, for example), their economic interests would be pro-
tected as they could choose to exit the LLC upon the payment of fair value.
While such revised statutes would allocate more power to the majority
interest holders in a tenancy in common and provide them with a greater
ability to control the disposition and use of the land, these statutes would
not raise takings issues. Individuals would retain their economic interest in
the property and such interests would likely increase in value because the
land could be used more productively as the owners would be in a better
position to secure financing. In the past two years, Congress has enacted
laws that enable the owners of a majority of the undivided interests in Na-
tive American allotments located on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in
North Dakota and on the former reservations of several tribes in Oklahoma
394 Tit. 6, § 18-214(h). Of course under current law, such a provision would prevent, for all practi-
cal purposes, those holding heir property to convert their ownership to an LLC because all ofthe interest
holders would have to agree to the conversion.
395 Tit. 6, §§ 18-209, -216.
396 Such a provision would allow those members of the newly formed LLC who were tenants in
common in possession for a period of time to remain in possession. In the operating agreement, however,
the members of the LLC can allocate the duties and rights of the members based upon %vhether they are in
possession or live away from the property. Such an allocation could provide for the amount of rental
money, if any, the "in" tenants would owe to the "out" tenants. Sce generally Lewis, supra note 367.
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to enter into mineral leases or agreements.397 Prior to enactment of these
statutes all of the tenants in common were required to consent to a mineral
lease. 3Q Congress indicated its belief that the owners of this land had suf-
fered significant economic losses because they could not consent to the ex-
ploration and development of the land by mining companies.
399
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the conversion of heir
property to another form might raise takings issues, the states clearly have the
authority to take such interests because the Supreme Court has greatly ex-
panded the circumstances under which property may be taken for a "public
use." In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midklff,46° the Supreme Court held that
a state seeking to exercise its powers of eminent domain need only demon-
strate that the taking of private property is rationally related to the achieve-
ment of a public purpose. In addition, the Midkiff Court did not view a taking
that transferred property from one private individual to others as inconsistent
with the public use requirement because the Court determined that the public
use requirement could be satisfied even if only a small percentage of a com-
munity benefits from a taking.401 Furthermore, in the unlikely event that an
individual's interest declined in value due to the change in ownership form,
such an individual should be entitled to receive, within a reasonable period of
time after the conversion, the difference in the value of their interest prior to
the conversion as opposed to the value from the ownership group.
2. State-Established Land Consolidation Courts. Allowing those
holding a majority interest in common property to convert to an ownership
form that allocates more control to the group will stabilize the ownership of
such land. Once ownership is stabilized, many current owners will need to
clear title before the land can be used productively. For example, one of the
more insoluble heir property problems has been the issue of the unknown
heir. Given the possibility of unknown heirs, it is difficult to clear title on
many heir property holdings, rendering it nearly impossible for those hold-
ing such property to use the property as collateral. Even if the majority in-
terest holders could convert the tenancy in common to an LLC, the
unknown heir problem would still need to be addressed in order to provide
the known heirs with clear title. In short, enabling the majority interest
holders to convert to an LLC would represent just one step in a process of
"legal consolidation" that would enable the ownership group to use their
land productively.
397 Act of Oct. 7, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-67, 113 Stat. 979 (amending Pub. L. No 105-188 to include
Native American lands located in Oklahoma); Act of July 7, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-188, 112 Stat. 620
(Fort Berthold reservation).
398 H.R. REP. No. 106-338, at 2 (1999); S. REP. No. 105-205, at 4 (1998).
399 Id.
400 467 U.S. 229, 241-22 (1984).
401 Id. at 244.
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In this country, those who own an interest in heir property that has
fallen into unproductive use have few options to improve the prevailing
ownership structure, rendering exit through initiation of partition actions an
attractive option. 2 Other countries, in contrast, have developed institu-
tions that enable interdependent owners who value the land for more than
its mere exchange value to play a role in improving the ownership structure,
or the special arrangement of the land holdings. Norway, for example, has
created specific legal institutions that seek to consolidate land in a manner
that is beneficial to all of those who may be affected by such consolidation.
These Norwegian institutions provide a good model that could be replicated
in this country with certain modifications.
In eighteenth-century Norway, as in many other parts of Europe, the
successive subdivision practices that occurred after enclosure resulted in in-
tense fragmentation of much of the rural land.0 3 After first enacting sig-
nificant land consolidation legislation in 1821, the Norwegian philosophy
that drove land consolidation evolved from the notion that fragmented
landholdings should be aggregated on a one-time basis to a view that land
consolidation "[must be] a continuous process, constantly readjusting the
ownership structure to changing economies, technology and patterns of land
use.' "A To achieve this end, Norway established a permanent Land Con-
solidation Service ("Service") in 1859.405 From the beginning, the Ser-
vice's decision-making body was organized as a court of law, and since
1950, these specialized tribunals have been called land consolidation
courts.40 6 Currently, throughout the country, there are forty-one such con-
solidation "trial" courts and five land consolidation courts of appeals.
4 7
The land consolidation "judges" (who are not required to be attorneys) must
have a degree from the Agricultural University of Norway with substantive
course work in land law, surveying, mapping, and land consolidation 03 In
402 In Albert Hirschman's lexicon, the heir property ovners have greater incentives to exit than to
use their "voice" to improve the prevailing ownership structure. See ALBERT O. HIRsCIMANw, EXIT,
VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). In distinguishing "voice" from "exit," Hirschman states that:
To resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the customer or member to make an attempt at
changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organiza-
tion to which one belongs. Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to es-
cape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the
management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a
change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are
meant to mobilize public opinion.
Id. at 30.
403 Sevatdal, supra note 353, at 7.
404 Id. at 9.
405 JORN ROGNES & PER KARE SKY, MEDIATION IN THE NORWEGIAN LAND CoNSOIDATION COURS
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addition, the land consolidation courts can call upon the expertise of the
Service, which employs 275 people, many with specialized training.
Land consolidation cases in Norway normally must be initiated by at
least one landowner or person holding a legal interest in the land subject to
potential consolidation.40 9 The courts use a two-prong test to determine
whether the land may be consolidated. First, there must be a "dependency
of some sort between the holdings in an area, with regard to efficient eco-
nomic use. ''4 The "dependency" is defined broadly:
The dependency could be due to location: the holdings are so physically
situated in relation to each other that the use of one affects the use of others,
and vica versa. [sic]. It could also be due to other physical or practical factors.
The dependency could also be rooted in the prevailing type of ownership from
a purely judicial point of view, for instance various sorts of joint (common)
ownership, rights of use and so on. 4
l
Second, it must be demonstrated that the prevailing ownership struc-
ture hinders the current or potential economic use of the land. 412 The land
consolidation courts can design remedies taking one of two different ap-
proaches. First, the judges can attempt to eliminate or minimize the de-
pendencies. Alternatively, the judges can introduce or formalize "rules for
co-operation where no such rules exist, to regulate the dependency, mini-
mizing the disadvantages, maximizing the advantages.
4 13
Along the lines of Norway, American states should establish land con-
solidation services staffed by trained professionals in land use planning,
land assessment, and land consolidation. Such state land consolidation ser-
vices should include courts staffed by judges with legal training (in prop-
erty, real estate, business organization, and environmental laws), as well as
substantive training in surveying, mapping (including mapping with high
technology geographic information systems), and land consolidation.
Those who own property in which the ownership form or physical pattern
of tracts limits the productive use of the land may initiate an action for legal
or spatial restructuring. By definition, this would include parcels under
fractionated heir ownership.
Not only the specialized land courts but the land consolidation service
in general would assist those who own heir property. Professionals in the
service could, for example, appraise land and survey land at a cost reflect-414 415
ing ability to pay. Unlike the courts in Norway, the state consolidation
409 Austen, supra note 350, at 139. However, in specific circumstances, the Ministry of Agriculture
may also initiate a land consolidation case. Id.
410 Sevatdal, supra note 353, at 3.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 AustenA, supra note 350, at 139.
414 See Graber, supra note 60, at 284 (noting that those who own heir property often need surveys of
their land done); see also Letter from Jennifer Binkley, second-year law student, University of Wiscon-
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courts should be vested with the authority to order fractionated tenancies in
common converted into other forms of ownership that are more stable and
provide better management mechanisms with the concurrence of a majority
of those holding an interest.
Like the proposal permitting those who own rural heir property to con-
vert their form of ownership with less than unanimous consent, the estab-
lishment of state land consolidation courts would break unproductive
ownership patterns weakening the rural land base. Access to such courts
should not be limited to rural African American landowners, but could ser-
vice all rural landowners across a broad spectrum of communities.
B. Restoration of Land Foreclosed Upon by the USDA
or Provision ofAlternative Land
The Pigford settlement provided for limited land restoration to black
farmers whose land was foreclosed upon by the USDA. Certain farmers
who prevail under the more risky and arduous arbitration procedure set
forth in the settlement, the so-called Track B, are entitled to the return of
formerly owned property that remains in the USDA inventory.4 16 If the
USDA has already transferred the land to a third party, the consent decree
provides no other mechanism for land restoration or, alternatively, for pro-
vision of other land. In approving this narrow land restoration remedy, the
judge reviewing the settlement assumed the federal government has limited
ability to restore land, stating: "[n]othing can.., restore lost land or lost
sin Law School to Thomas WV. Mitchell (Sept. 30, 1999) (noting, in the course ofparticipating in a legal
externship with the Land Loss Prevention Project in Durham, North Carolina in the summer of 1999,
that poor people almost always need surveys when they either are involved in property disputes or are
trying to clear title) (letter on file with author).
415 In an interview with Judge Per KAre Sky ofthe Norwegian Land Consolidation Court. Judge Sky
stated that the Norwegian land consolidation courts are increasingly handling consolidation cases ad-
dressing those who own undivided interests under a form called "personal joint ownership." a form of
ownership analogous to a tenancy in common. Electronic Interview with Judge Per Ore Sky, Norwe-
gian Land Consolidation Court of Nord- and Midhordland (Sept. 21, 1999). Although the courts have
the power to divide the land in kind, the judges sometimes try to assist the common owners to make
agreements that regulate the ownership of the land or to enter into buy-sell agreements with one another.
However, in answering a follow-up question, Judge Sky later stated that the consolidation courts in
Norway do not have the power to force buying and selling among the common owners or to convert the
personal joint ownership holdings into other forms of ownership. Electronic Interview with Judge Per
Kre Sky, Norwegian Land Consolidation Court of Nord- and Midhordland (Sept. 24, 1999).
416 The Pigford consent decree provides that if an arbitrator rules in favor of a class member who
elects to proceed under Track B, the class member is entitled to reliefincluding the following:
The immediate termination of any foreclosure proceedings that have been initiated against
any of the class member's real property in connection with the ECOA claim(s) resolved in the
class member's favor by the arbitrator, and the return of any USDA inventory property that wras
formerly owned by the class member but which was foreclosed in connection with the ECOA
claim(s) resolved in the class member's favor by the arbitrator.
Pigford v. Glickman, No. 97-1978, 9(a)(iii)(B) (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 1999) (consent decree).
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opportunities to Mr. Beverly or to all of the other African American farm-
ers.A
17
This is simply not true. Throughout this nation's history, the federal
government has distributed land to individuals, states, and private entities
with less individualized claims than those black farmers who lost land di-
rectly as a result of the federal government's discrimination .41  For exam-
ple, the government allocated huge tracts of federal land to mostly white
homesteaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to
help these people enter into the economic mainstream of society.49 Fur-
thermore, many land grant universities throughout the country came into
operation only after the federal government provided the necessary land.42
In these instances, land in the government's inventory was transferred in
order to serve specific federal policies.
The change in federal Indian policy throughout the twentieth century
provides further proof that the government can act to restore land to people
who have unjustly lost their land due to discriminatory acts of the govem-
ment.41' In the early part of the twentieth century, federal Indian policy
sought to assimilate Native Americans, in part by stripping them of much of
their land. Conversely, modem federal Indian policy aims to improve the
land tenure security for many Native Americans and tribes, and enables
tribes to add to their land base. From passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934 to the present, Native American lands held in trust by the fed-
eral government have increased by nearly eight million acres. These exam-
ples demonstrate that the federal government can, if it chooses, help rural
African Americans stabilize and increase their landholdings. Of course, this
would require the government to adopt a policy that specifically promotes
rural African American landownership.
Given the demonstrated significance of African American landowner-
ship and the acknowledged, widespread discriminatory conduct of the
USDA, the USDA should return any formerly black-owned land in its in-
ventory to any prior owners who are members of the Pigford class. Addi-
417 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 103-04 (1999).
418 RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 137-40, 145-47 (1991) (noting that beginning in the eighteenth century, Congress be-
gan awarding land to individual states and private entities to promote particular governmental and socie-
tal goals, including encouraging enlistment in the military, facilitating interstate commerce by making
rivers more navigable, and helping western farmers who settled land under the Homestead Act of 1862
obtain access to markets through expansion of the railroad system).
419 See id. at 143-45, 433; see also DAVID B. DANBOM, BORN IN THE COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF
RURAL AMERICA 113-14, 143-44 (1995); LANZA, supra note 125, at 18; OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note
117, at 14-15. The attempt to create a significant class of African American landowners under the
Southern Homestead Act of 1866 ultimately failed, in part due to discrimination against black applicants
and black homesteaders who initially were able to obtain land under the Act. Id. at 79-87, 122-24.
420 DANBOM, supra note 419, at 113, 119; see also WHITE, supra note 418, at 142.
421 See supra subpart IV.A.
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tionally, the USDA's inventory obviously includes other land, including
land that was foreclosed upon for reasons wholly unconnected to the dis-
criminatory conduct established in the Pigford lawsuit. Consistent with the
charge of the Freedmen's Bureau to distribute "abandoned lands," some of
the land from the USDA's inventory should be reallocated to the black
farmers in the Pigford class whose land was foreclosed upon but subse-
quently transferred to another party. Such provision of"in lieu" land would
be consistent with land reform measures adopted by other countries that
have attempted to make whole individuals and groups who were unjustly
dispossessed of their land.4z In short, if the federal government were to
adopt a policy that recognized the importance of black, rural landownership,
land restoration and acquisition could be assured.
C. Legal Services Attorneys with Specialized Training Should Be Hired
to Provide Assistance to Heir Property Owners
Congress should expand the mission of legal services to allow legal
services attorneys to provide legal assistance to poor landowners, including
those who own an interest in heir property. Such an expanded mission will
necessarily require additional funding for legal services offices to meet the
needs of these newly eligible clients. For example, local legal services or-
ganizations would need to hire attorneys with training or experience in es-
tate planning, real estate transactions, property, tax, business organizations,
and environmental law.423 In order to begin building a cadre of lawyers in-
terested in working with poor, rural landowners, these legal services offices
could also establish internship programs that would allow law students to
acquire specific expertise in land-related cases. 4
In addition to handling individual cases, legal services offices should
conduct regular community legal education workshops to educate poor, ru-
ral landowners about the laws that impact their ability to retain ownership
of their land. These workshops could address issues such as land records,
tax obligations and tax redemption, liens and foreclosure, adverse posses-
sion, and mineral, mining, water, and timber rights. The legal services at-
torneys could also address legal problems that normally crop up in
tenancies in common, such as how to allocate responsibility between coten-
ants for costs associated with maintaining the property, how to deal with the
422 For example, South Africa adopted the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1994. Under the Act,
those successful claimants who lost land due to the government's discriminatory acts since 1913 are en-
titled to relief that may include restoration of their original land, the provision of"in lieu" land, or mone-
tary compensation.
423 See Graber, supra note 60, at 284.
424 In fact, a clinical legal extemship program this author directs has begun to train law students to
work with rural landowners. Since the extemship program was started four years ago, sixteen law stu-
dents from the University of Wisconsin, Stanford, the University of Tennessee, and Howard University
have worked throughout rural America during the summer with rural landowners whose lack of access
to legal services places their landownership at risk.
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issues of waste, and how to redeem property after a tax sale. Further, local
community activists (or in some instances landowners themselves) could be
trained to conduct title searches at local county courthouses so that those
who own an interest in land can determine who else has a claim to the prop-
erty. To help reduce further fractionation, there must be continuous educa-
tion about the importance of making wills. Legal services offices should
develop form wills that can be modified with little effort. More broadly,
such community legal education programs could also help rural landowners
begin to do financial planning that would help landowners avoid losing
their land-as so many poor, rural landowners have lost their land-due to
financial distress.
D. Placing African American Heritage Land into Trust
The federal government, the courts, and the general public recognize
that certain Native American-owned ancestral land constitutes a vital part of
the Native American heritage. Now, the federal government should recog-
nize that the small amount of rural land still under black landownership
represents a part of the African American heritage.425 At a minimum, land
currently owned by African Americans that was initially acquired by black
people either prior to or within a generation of the close of the Civil War
should receive special federal protection. According to a report by the
Emergency Land Fund in 1980, only a small percentage of this land cur-
rently remains in the families of the original black landowner.
In addition to this land, land set aside for specific black communities
during the New Deal resettlement programs should be eligible for special
federal protection. Although the total number of rural acres set aside for
these black communities was small, these communities served as a beacon
for many rural black people who believed that landownership could transform
their lives. In the past few years, rural sociologists, anthropologists, and other
academics have begun to study anew the important role these communities
played in uplifting the hopes of rural African Americans across the South.426
Given the unique status of the two categories of land described above, the
federal government should recognize this land as African American heritage
land.427 Owners of such heritage land should be eligible for federal support
425 See, e.g., Flooded Black Town Decides to Rebuild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1999, at A21 (discuss-
ing recent flooding of historic town that was the first in the nation to be chartered and governed by
blacks after it was founded by freed slaves after the Civil War).
426 COUTO, supra note I 11, at 184-86; JOHN DITIMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGOGLE FOR THE
CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 191 (1994); Zabawa & Warren, supra note 216; Spencer D. Wood, Re-
forming Land and People in the Mississippi Delta: The Resettlement Community of Mileston, Missis-
sippi, 1937-1998 (1999) (unpublished paper presented at the 1999 Social Science History Association
Annual Meeting in Fort Worth, Texas) (on file with the author).
427 Other land that could be categorized as African American heritage land would be land still under
black ownership that once served as the sites for historically black colleges and universities that were
opened after the end of the Civil War, but have now ceased operation.
From Reconstntction to Deconsiruction
that could include financial assistance earmarked for helping to restore his-
torically important buildings on the land, either federal management of the
property under a trust relationship or federal assistance in helping these land-
owners establish private land trusts, and the building of museums or ar-
chives that would document the history of the acquisition and use of the
land by the black landowners.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the Civil War, the federal government failed to redistrib-
ute land to African Americans. Without such governmental assistance,
many African Americans made heroic sacrifices to purchase land on their
own. However, the fifteen-million-acre land base that many black families
built up in the South between the end of the Civil War and 1910 has been
almost completely wiped out. In recent decades, thousands of black fami-
lies have lost their land due to partition sales, many of which were initiated
by outsiders who acquired an interest in a tenancy in common with the sole
intention of forcing a sale. Although heir property continues to represent an
especially unstable form of ownership, those who own such property find it
nearly impossible to reorganize their land under a form that would provide
better mechanisms to foster continued ownership by the group because of
the requirement that all of the "cotenants by law" agree to any change in the
default rules governing tenancies in common.
President Clinton has spoken passionately about the threat posed to our
society by the growing divide in access to technology between the wealthy
and those who are less privileged. The inability of certain groups to partici-
pate fully in our society-and in the global societ)-due to their inability to
access the Internet and other computer technology represents but one exam-
ple of a technological divide separating more privileged groups from others.
Those who own heir property are essentially locked into a substandard, anti-
quated form of landownership that presents an easy target for land specula-
tors. The newer forms of ownership that the law has developed in order to
assure greater continuity of ownership currently remain beyond the reach of
those owning heir property.
Federal and state governmental bodies need only decide that the frac-
tionated heir property problem is worth addressing. At least in the Native
American context, in the past year, the federal government has decided that
this problem merits policy intervention. In November 1999, President Clin-
ton signed into law the "Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of
2000."4  This public law represents Congress's latest effort to improve the
widespread problem of fractionation of Native American allotments. Inter-
estingly enough, the section of the public law that sets forth the policy ob-
428 Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L No. 106.462, S. 1586, 106th
Cong. (2000).
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jectives of the law, expressly indicates that heir property holdings should be
consolidated in a manner that enhances tribal sovereignty, self-sufficiency,
and self-determination. 29 A policy that sought to improve the fractionated
heir property problem that impacts African Americans would not support
widespread partition sales, despite the fact that partition sales certainly im-
prove fractionation. Just as policymakers should be concerned about ad-
dressing the Native American heir property problem in a way that enhances
the ability of tribes to be both more politically self-determining and
economically more self-sufficient, such policymakers should respond to the
crisis in land loss in African American communities caused by partition
sales of land held under tenancies in common, given the established links
between landownership, community, and democratic participation.
429 Id. at §102. ("It is the policy of the United States - (1) to prevent the further fractionation of
trust allotments made to Indians; (2) to consolidate fractional interests and ownership of those interests
into usable parcels, (3) to consolidate fractional interests in a manner than enhances tribal sovereignty;
(4) to promote tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination; and (5) to reverse the effects of the allot-
ment policy on Indian tribes.").
